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Preface 
 
The Research Project seeks to study the implications of financial 
liberalisation, global financial integration and cross-border capital 
flows for the Indian economy. The direction of policy change in India 
over the past two decades and a half has been in this direction. The 
domestic financial sector has grown significantly in the past decade, 
which has impacted the trajectory of real sector growth and economic 
development. 
The report contains four chapters. The first one introduces the 
readers to the Indian macroeconomic scene over the past two decades 
and the financial aspects of the growth process. The second chapter 
focuses on the internal dimensions of the growth process and the 
recent developments in the financial sector, especially the bad loans 
crisis. The third chapter looks at financial globalisation and its 
impact on India’s external vulnerability. The concluding chapter 
presents a theoretical model which seeks to explain the nature and 
consequences of financial liberalisation and the integration of the 
Indian economy into the globalised economy.  
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the review committee for this project. Profs. Prabhat Patnaik, 
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observations and suggestions throughout the evolution of the work, 
which has helped us immensely.  
Our colleagues Dr. Jyotirmoy Bhattacharya and Dr. Subhanil 
Chowdhury have followed this work closely and provided valuable 
feedback. Dr. Sougata Kerr and Dr. Shouvik Chakraborty took the 
time out to attend the first workshop and made interesting 
observations. We would like to thank all the participants in the three 
workshops we held during the tenure of this project. We have also 
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benefited from the insights provided by Dr. Samiran Chakraborty 
and Mr. Ashish Gupta. Profs. Philip Lane and G Maria Milesi-
Ferretti were kind enough to share an updated version of a crucial 
database for which we are most grateful.  
We would like to acknowledge the rigorous research assistance 
provided by Zico Dasgupta. Sucheta Sardar, Kingshuk Roy, Rashika 
Nagar, Anurag Kakkar and Sushant Singh have also provided 
research assistance at various stages of the project. Mr. Sanjiv Rao, 
finance officer at CSD, Hyderabad has been very patient with our 
varied requests. Dr. Soumya Vinayan was kind enough to help us 
organise the final workshop at CSD, Hyderabad.  
We thank them all for their cooperation in the successful completion 
of the project. The usual disclaimers apply to all of the above, who 
cannot be held responsible for our mistakes and omissions.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The post-reform growth process in India, which occurred alongside an 
increasing integration with the global economy, can be seen in terms 
of three phases. The first phase roughly coincides with the first 
decade after the reforms were initiated, in which the growth rate 
remained almost similar to the decade of the 1980s. The second phase 
starts from 2003, when a visible acceleration of the real GDP growth 
rate was witnessed. While the high growth phase continued despite 
the setback of the global financial crisis in 2008, the economy started 
slowing down considerably from 2011. Official estimates claim that 
the Indian economy has already recovered from the slowdown and 
emerged as the fastest growing major economy in the world in 2015, 
overtaking China (See Table 1.1 & Chart 1.1 below). Whether such a 
turnaround has been achieved since 2013 as suggested by the new 
GDP series, however, remains questionable.1  
Table 1.1: Average Annual Growth Rates of Real GDP (%) 
Period World Advanced Economies 
Emerging 
Economies China India 
1981-1990 3.4 3.3 3.5 9.3 5.6 
1991-2000 3.3 2.8 3.9 10.4 5.6 
2001-2010 3.9 1.7 6.3 10.5 7.6 
2011-2015 3.5 1.6 5 7.8 6.6 
2015 3.1 2 4 6.8 7.3 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 
																																								 																				
1 The Central Statistical Organization released a new series of national accounts in 
January 2015, revising the base year from 2004-05 to 2011-12. The new series used 
a different corporate sector database which led to the increase in the size of the 
private corporate sector in aggregate GDP in 2011-12 from 23.7% in the old series 
to 34.7%, much of it because of an abnormal 309% increase in the GDP estimates 
for the private financial corporate sector. Such revisions have showed up in a 
higher GDP growth rate of 6.6% in 2013-14 as per the new series, compared to 
4.7% in the earlier series (Nagraj, 2015). The new series has also come under 
criticism for the use of WPI as a deflator for sectors like manufacturing, trade and 
finance, resulting in over-estimations of the GDP growth rate (Sengupta, 2016).   
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Chart 1.1: Annual Growth Rates of Real GDP (%) 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 
The fact that the growth performance of the Indian economy in the 
1990s - the first post-reform decade - was by and large similar to the 
1980s, has been widely noted and commented upon. De Long (2003) 
suggested that the ‘structural break’ in India’s growth had occured in 
the mid-1980s and the rather limited measures of trade liberalization 
of the 1980s had a stronger growth impact compared to the more 
sweeping policy changes brought in 1991. Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 
(2002) emphasised the role played by a widening fiscal deficit (centre 
and states combined) in providing stimulus to growth in the 1980s 
and highlighted the absence of any significant increase in the average 
rate of economic growth, investment and savings in the 1990s, 
compared to the earlier decade. Ahluwalia (2002), while admitting 
the absence of any acceleration in the growth rate pointed to the 
‘remarkable external stability’ of the 1990s growth in contrast to the 
unsustainable external debt build up of the 1980s, and argued that 
gradualist reforms of the 1990s had laid the basis for a higher growth 
trajectory in future.  
High growth experienced in the last decade has renewed the debate 
on the impact of reforms on economic growth, with some proponents 
of reforms arguing that liberalization of external trade and 
investment has resulted in economic growth taking off ‘dramatically’ 
which in turn has led to significant declines in poverty (Bhagwati 
and Panagariya, 2013). Others, while lauding the impact of reforms 
on economic growth as a ‘significant achievement’, have pointed out 
the lopsided nature of the growth process, which has led to widely 
different speeds at which living standards have improved for the 
upper income groups and the rest of the population, as well as the 
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continuing lag in India’s human development indicators, even in 
comparison to poorer developing countries (Drèze and Sen, 2013). 
These appraisals, while contending with each other on the socio-
economic impact of growth, however, converge on attributing faster 
economic growth to market oriented reforms.  
The present study takes a different view regarding India’s integration 
with the global economy by focussing on the financial aspects of the 
growth process. Our findings suggest that while trade and financial 
opening may have triggered faster growth almost a decade after the 
initiation of reforms, a crucial role was played by the state in 
sustaining and prolonging the boom beyond the 2007-08 global 
financial crisis. A credit bubble was generated through the public 
sector banking system, complemented by external debt finance, 
particularly in the infrastructure sector. This has resulted in 
increased financial fragility, manifested in an unprecedented rise in 
corporate indebtedness and mirrored in the accumulation of bad 
debts in the banking system, alongside enhanced external 
vulnerability. The study concludes with an analytical exposition 
depicting the faultlines of such a growth trajectory. 
Growth and Investment since 2000 
The world economy had slowed down in the late 1990s following the 
financial crisis in East Asia, which had later spread to Russia, 
Argentina, Brazil and Turkey. The advanced economies also went 
into a recession in the early 2000s following the collapse of the 
dotcom bubble in the US. The global economic recovery started in 
2002 and led to a boom between 2003 and 2008, with world GDP and 
world trade (in value) growing at an average annual rate of 4.7% and 
15%, respectively.  
Export ‘Induced’ Growth 
The acceleration of India’s economic growth since 2003 coincided 
with the global economic boom, with India’s share in world 
merchandise and services exports growing from 0.6% and 1% 
respectively in 1999 to 0.8% and 1.4% in 2003, and went on to peak 
at 1.7% and 3.3% respectively, in 2011 (Chart 1.2).  
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Chart 1.2: India’s Share in World Merchandise and Commercial Services 
Exports (%) 
 
Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics, Various Issues 
India’s merchandise exports-GDP ratio, which had risen from the 
1980s average of 4.4% to 7.6% in the 1990s, witnessed a sharp rise to 
9.3% in 2000-01 and continued to rise to almost 15% in 2008-09 and 
peaked at 16.8% in 2013-14 (Table 1.2). While this points towards an 
important role played by export markets in stimulating the economic 
boom in the 2000s, it is noteworthy that imports have grown much 
faster than exports in the 2000s unlike in the 1990s, which reflect a 
net dampening effect of trade openness on aggregate demand. The 
import-GDP ratio had also risen sharply from an average of 9% in 
the 1990s to 10.6% in 2000-01, further to 24.4% in 2008-09 and 
peaked at 26.4% in 2012-13. The merchandise trade balance, which 
had remained consistently negative for India through the 1980s and 
1990s, rose to historically high levels in the 2000s, reaching -9.5% of 
GDP in 2008-09, subsequently peaking at over -10% in 2012-13.   
India’s oil trade has been in deficit since the 1970s. The non-oil trade 
balance, however, turned positive on average in the 1990s and 
improved further in the first four years of the 2000s decade, despite 
the oil trade balance deteriorating during this period. Additionally, 
the net invisibles to GDP ratio increased significantly from 2000-01, 
reflecting the rise in India’s services exports during this period driven 
by software services, coupled with substantial net private transfers in 
the form of remittances. The overall result was reflected in a positive 
current account balance for the Indian economy for three consecutive 
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years starting from 2001-02, with the current account surplus 
reaching 2.3% of GDP in 2003-04 (Chart 1.3). 
Table 1.2: Merchandise Exports, Imports and Trade Balance (% of 
GDP) 
 
Exports/GDP Imports/GDP 
Oil Trade 
Balance/GDP 
Non-Oil 
Trade 
Balance/GDP 
Trade 
Balance/GDP 
1980-81 to 
1989-90 4.4 7.0 -1.7 -0.9 -2.5 
1990-91 to 
1999-00 7.6 9.0 -1.9 0.6 -1.4 
 
2000-01    9.3 10.6 -2.9 1.6 -1.3 
2001-02    8.9 10.4 -2.4 0.9 -1.5 
2002-03    10.1 11.7 -2.9 1.2 -1.7 
2003-04    10.3 12.6 -2.7 0.4 -2.3 
2004-05    11.6 15.5 -3.2 -0.7 -3.9 
2005-06    12.4 17.9 -3.9 -1.6 -5.5 
2006-07    13.3 19.6 -4.1 -2.2 -6.3 
2007-08    13.2 20.3 -4.1 -3.0 -7.1 
2008-09    14.9 24.4 -5.3 -4.2 -9.5 
2009-10    13.1 21.1 -4.3 -3.7 -8.0 
2010-11    14.7 21.6 -3.8 -3.2 -6.9 
2011-12    16.3 26.0 -5.3 -4.5 -9.8 
2012-13    16.2 26.4 -5.5 -4.7 -10.2 
2013-14    16.8 23.9 -5.4 -1.7 -7.1 
2014-15    15.1 21.8 -4.0 -2.7 -6.7 
Source: Calculated from RBI’s Database on Indian Economy (DGCIS 
data) 
India’s oil trade has been in deficit since the 1970s. The non-oil trade 
balance, however, turned positive on average in the 1990s and 
improved further in the first four years of the 2000s decade, despite 
the oil trade balance deteriorating during this period. Additionally, 
the net invisibles to GDP ratio increased significantly from 2000-01, 
reflecting the rise in India’s services exports during this period driven 
by software services, coupled with substantial net private transfers in 
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the form of remittances. The overall result was reflected in a positive 
current account balance for the Indian economy for three consecutive 
years starting from 2001-02, with the current account surplus 
reaching 2.3% of GDP in 2003-04 (Chart 1.3). This indicates the 
stimulus from external markets that contributed to the growth 
acceleration, with the GDP growth rate rising from around 4% in 
2002-03 to 8% in 2003-04.     
Chart 1.3: Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 
 
 
Source: Calculated from RBI, Database on Indian Economy (BoP data) 
 
By 2004-05 though, the current account balance had once again 
turned negative. It is important to note that throughout the boom 
period, from 2003-04 to 2007-08, when the Indian economy 
experienced an average annual GDP growth rate of around 8.7%, the 
merchandise trade and current account deficit continued to rise. The 
non-oil trade balance also turned negative from 2004-05 and 
worsened in tandem with the oil trade deficit. Thus, while the 
stimulus from external markets played a role in setting off the 
growth acceleration, the sustenance of the boom cannot be attributed 
to export surpluses.2  
Unlike China, India’s growth in the 2000s was accompanied by a 
marked deterioration of its trade and current account balance as a 
share of GDP. The rising external deficit was not only on account of 
																																								 																				
2 Ghosh Dastidar (2015) argues on the basis of a survey of empirical evidence that 
India’s growth can be better characterised as export ‘induced’, where favourable 
conditions in the world market have caused an increase in exports, rather than 
being export ‘led’, as has been experienced by the East Asian economies, which 
resulted from state-directed export promotion strategies. 
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increasing international prices and volumes of oil imports, but for 
rising imports of a range of non-oil commodities including capital 
goods, coal and gold, signifying an increase in the import intensity of 
the economy. The current account deficit reached a record -4.8% of 
GDP in 2012-13, which led to an episode of capital flight and 
currency depreciation in the next financial year.3 We shall return to 
the implications of this when we discuss the external vulnerability of 
the growth process in the third chapter.     
Private Corporate Investment  
The economic boom since 2003-04 saw a significant rise in the 
investment and savings rate of the economy. While gross domestic 
capital formation and gross domestic savings as a share of GDP had 
seen minor increases from 20.4% and 18.6% respectively on average 
in the 1980s to 24.3% and 23% in the 1990s, the investment and 
savings rates started climbing from 2003-04 to peak at 38.1% and 
36.8% in 2007-08, before declining to 34.8% and 30.1% in 2012-13 
(Table 1.3). A notable aspect in this is the sharp rise in private 
corporate investment. The private corporate sector’s gross capital 
formation as a share of GDP remained well below that of the public 
sector in the 1980s and 1990s. This got reversed in the 2000s with the 
private corporate sector’s investment rate surpassing that of the 
public sector by 2004-05 and peaking at 17.3% in 2007-08, after 
which it has declined to 9.2% in 2012-13. The public sector’s 
investment rate fell considerably till 2002-03, but rose consistently 
thereafter to above 9% between 2008-10, reflecting the fiscal 
expansion in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.     
The estimation of private corporate investment which showed up in 
the sharp rise in the investment rate since 2003-04 has been 
questioned on methodological grounds.4 While it is quite likely that 
the CSO estimates have exaggerated the gross capital formation in 
the private corporate sector in the 2000s, other evidence does point 
towards a faster expansion of private investment compared to public 
																																								 																				
3 Bose (2013) discusses the currency depreciation episode in May 2013 in relation to 
the growing current account deficit and external indebtedness.  
4 Nagraj (2008) pointed out that the methodology of ‘blowing up’ up the 
investment and savings data from RBI’s limited sample of around 2000 companies 
over the paid up capital of all companies registered with the Registrar of 
Companies led to serious overestimations, since a very large proportion of such 
registered companies are economically inactive, shell companies. 
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investment during this period. CMIE’s Capex database captures 
investment projects involving capital expenditure over Rs. 1 crore 
since 1995-96. The data on the stock of investment projects under 
implementation show a trend similar to the one suggested by the 
CSO estimates.  
Table 1.3: Rates of Savings and Investment (% of GDP) 
(Base Year: 2004-05) 
 
Gross 
Domestic 
Savings/ 
GDP 
Gross Domestic 
Capital 
Formation/ 
GDP 
Gross Capital Formation/GDP 
Public 
Sector 
Private 
Corporate 
Sector 
Househol
d Sector 
1980-81 to 1989-90 18.6 20.4 11.1 4.3 6.7 
1990-91 to 1999-00 23 24.3 8.8 7 8 
2000-01 23.7 24.3 7.1 4.9 11.4 
2001-02 24.8 24.2 7.2 5.1 12.6 
2002-03 25.9 24.8 6.4 5.7 12.3 
2003-04 29.0 26.8 6.6 6.5 12.1 
2004-05 32.4 32.8 7.4 10.3 13.4 
2005-06 33.4 34.7 7.9 13.6 11.7 
2006-07 34.6 35.7 8.3 14.5 11.9 
2007-08 36.8 38.1 8.9 17.3 10.8 
2008-09 32.0 34.3 9.4 11.3 13.5 
2009-10 33.7 36.5 9.2 12.1 13.2 
2010-11 33.7 36.5 8.4 12.8 13.2 
2011-12 31.3 35.5 7.7 10.1 15.8 
2012-13 30.1 34.8 8.1 9.2 14.8 
Source: Calculated from RBI’s Database on Indian Economy (CSO data) 
The nominal value of the stock of investment projects being 
implemented in the private sector surpassed that of government 
investment projects by end March 2007, and maintained the upward 
trend till end-March 2012, stagnating thereafter (Chart 1.4.a). The 
share of private investment projects in total investment projects 
under implementation rose from 38% in 2005-06 to 52% in 2006-07, 
peaked at 61% in 2010-11 and subsequently dropped to 47% by 2015-
16 (Chart 1.4.b). 
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Chart 1.4.a: Investment Projects Outstanding  
(Under Implementation)(in Rs. Billion) 
 
 
Source: CMIE, CapEx Database  
 
Chart 1.4.b: Investment Projects Outstanding  
(Under Implementation) 
(% Shares of Government and Private Projects by Nominal Value) 
 
Source: CMIE, CapEx Database  
The fiscal indicators of the centre and states combined provide 
further confirmation of the trends.  The gross fiscal deficit which 
averaged around 7.7% of GDP in the 1980s and 7.5% in the 1990s 
had reached 9.3% of GDP in 2002-03 (Chart 1.5.a). With the 
inception of the boom phase, the gross fiscal deficit to GDP fell 
continuously from 2003-04 to reach 4% in 2007-08. Total government 
expenditure to GDP declined from 28% in 2003-04 to 26.4% in 2007-
08 and total receipts rose from 19.8% to 22.4% in the same period. 
Gross capital formation from the central budgetary resources to 
GDP, which averaged around 6.7% in the 1980s, fell to 4.5% in the 
1980s and further to 2.7% of GDP in the 2000s.  
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Chart 1.5.a: Government Expenditure, Receipts & Gross Fiscal 
Deficit of Centre & States Combined (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Calculated from RBI, Database on Indian Economy (Handbook) 
Chart 1.5.b: Tax Revenues, Direct Taxes and Revenue Deficit  
of Centre & States Combined (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Calculated from RBI, Database on Indian Economy (Handbook) 
The combined gross fiscal deficit rose sharply to 8.3% of GDP in 
2008-09, reflecting the fiscal stimulus of the government provided in 
the wake of the global financial crisis and recession. Since the crisis, 
total expenditures have increased and receipts declined, with the 
fiscal deficit averaging around 7.5% of GDP. The revenue deficit, 
which had declined to almost zero by 2007-08 increased sharply to 
5.7% of GDP by 2009-10 (Chart 1.5.b). This was because of a 
significant fall in the tax-GDP ratio between 2008 and 2010, because 
the post-crisis fiscal stimulus had come more in the form of tax 
breaks (2.4% of GDP) than in terms of rising government 
expenditures (2.2% of GDP). The direct taxes to GDP ratio, which 
had peaked at 7% of GDP in 2007-08 has averaged around 6.5% in 
the post-crisis period. 
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Thus, the boom of the 2000s was accompanied by a decline in public 
expenditure to GDP and a steeper decline of the gross fiscal deficit to 
GDP, which confirms the larger role of private investment during the 
expansionary phase. Moreover, the contribution of budgetary 
resources of the central government in gross capital formation has 
also shown a long-term declining trend.  
Investment in Infrastructure 
The faster expansion of private investment in the 2000s occured not 
only in those sectors of manufacturing and services where the private 
corporate sector had a traditional presence, but also in the 
infrastructure sector, where private investment was practically absent 
till in the 1990s. As per Planning Commission estimates, total 
investment in the infrastructure sector — defined as electricity, roads 
& bridges, telecommunications, railways, irrigation, water supply & 
sanitation, ports, airports, storage and oil & gas pipelines — 
increased from 5% of GDP during the Tenth Plan period (2002-03 to 
2005-06) to 7.2% of GDP during the Eleventh Plan (2007-08 to 2011-
12), with the share of private investment in total infrastructure 
investment rising from around 22% to 36% (Table 1.4). It is 
noteworthy that the share of private investment in infrastructure 
overshot the target of 30% set in the Eleventh Plan, mainly on 
account of enhanced levels of investments in sectors like power, 
telecommunications and gas pipelines.     
Table 1.4: Investment in Infrastructure (% of GDP) 
  
10th Plan 
Total  
(2002-03 to 
2006-07) 
11th Plan  
(2007-08 to 
2011-12) 
12th Plan  
(2012-13 to  
2016-17) 
12th Plan 
 (2012-13 to 
2016-17) 
  (Actual) (Actual)  
(Initial 
Projection) 
(Revised 
Projection) 
Total 5.04 (100) 7.21 (100) 8.18 (100) 5.71 (100) 
Public  3.92 (77) 4.57 (64) 4.24 (52) 3.47 (60) 
Private 1.12 (22) 2.64 (36)  3.94 (48) 2.23 (40) 
Source: Planning Commission, Twelfth Plan Document &  
High Level Committee on Financing Infrastructure 
The emphasis on encouraging private investments in the 
infrastructure sector in the Eleventh Plan was also reflected in a shift 
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to PPPs (Public-Private Partnerships) in infrastructure development. 
Data on infratructure projects from the DEA database show the rise 
in the number and value of PPP projects (above Rs. 5 crore) from 
2002-03 (Charts 1.6.a & b). The total number of PPP projects 
peaked at 89 in 2010-11 and 2011-12, while in terms of total project 
cost it peaked at Rs. 786 billion in 2007-08. Since 2012-13 there has 
been a gradual decline in the PPP projects. Private sector projects in 
infrastructure kickstarted in 2006-07 and peaked in 2014-15 at 106 
projects with total project cost of Rs. 314 billion. Traditional 
government projects also saw an increase from 11 projects with total 
project cost of Rs. 264 billion in 2003-04 to 110 projects with total 
cost of Rs. 1.1 trillion in 2008-09. Government projects peaked in 
2013-14 both in terms of numbers at 315 projects as well as in terms 
of project cost at Rs. 1.4 trillion.    
Chart 1.6.a: Number of Infrastructure Projects Awarded 
 
 
   
Chart 1.6.b: Total Project Cost of Infrastructure Project 
Awarded (Rs. Billion) 
 
Source: Database of Infrastructure Projects in India, Department of 
Economic Affairs, GoI 
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Investment in infrastructure, both public and private, played an 
important role in prolonging the economic boom of the 2000s, 
especially during the period of the Eleventh Plan (2006-07 to 2011-
12). This role became particularly crucial in sustaining growth in 
India after the 2007-08 global crisis. However, this high rate of 
investment in infrastructure could not be sustained in the Twelfth 
Plan (2012-13 to 2016-17). The Planning Commission’s (2014) High 
Level Committee on Financing Infrastructure noted that anticipated 
investment in infrastructure in 2012-13, the first year of the Twelfth 
Plan, was only 66% of what was targeted and had fallen below what 
was actually realised in 2008-09. The Committee revised the 
projections for infrastructure investment in the Twelfth Plan from 
8.2% of GDP to 5.7% of GDP, with both public and private 
investment projected to drop sharply. This clearly signalled the end 
of the expansionary phase of the economy.  
The following points emerge from our discussion on the Indian 
growth experience of the 2000s. First, there was a boom which 
started in 2003-04, continued even after 2007-08 global crisis with 
minor disruptions, but came to an end in 2011-12. Second, while 
export markets played a role in causing the growth acceleration in 
the early years of the last decade, the rising trade and current 
account deficits have acted as a dampener on aggregate demand. 
India’s growth story was therefore different from the export-led 
growth stories of China or the ASEAN. Third, private corporate 
investment expanded more rapidly than public investment for most 
of the high growth phase but have fallen to equivalent levels since 
the end of the boom. The fiscal deficit contracted during the boom 
phase but has expanded since the global recession. Fourth, both 
public and private investment in infrastructure had risen significantly 
during the boom, with a proliferation of PPP projects, but it turned 
out to be an unsustainable expansion with such investments falling 
from 2012-13. We now proceed to study the financial aspects of this 
growth phase to better understand its relationship with economic 
reforms.         
Financial Aspects of Growth 
Financial reforms initiated since 1991, involving the removal of 
controls and regulations on financial markets and capital flows, were 
expected to lead to financial ‘deepening’ through a transformation of 
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the financial structures. Standard indicators of financial depth are 
stock market capitalisation to GDP and bank credit to GDP.5 Stock 
market capitalisation to GDP, which had initially risen from below 
20% of GDP in the 1980s to almost 50% in the immediate aftermath 
of financial opening in 1991-92, had fallen sharply since 1999-2000 
and had reached to around 22% of GDP in 2002-03 (Chart 1.7.a). 
The boom period since 2003-04 saw a reversal of this trend and stock 
market capitalisation rose continuously to cross 100% of GDP in 
2007-08. After a correction in 2008-09 it rose in 2009-10 but fell again 
in 2011-12 and was around 65% of GDP in 2013-14. Much of these 
movements in stock market valuation have been driven by flows of 
foreign portfolio capital (FPIs), which have been progressively 
liberalized since 1991.  
Financing the Boom  
While the average annual stock market capitalisation roughly 
followed the pattern of growth of the real economy, its role in terms 
of financing the economic boom has, however, been miniscule (Chart 
1.7.b). New public issues of equity and debt by private companies 
taken together reached around 2.5% of GDP in 1992-93 and have not 
crossed that level ever since. It is noteworthy that even though the 
boom since 2003-04 was led by private corporate investment, the 
amount of capital mobilised from the primary equity market touched 
merely 1% of GDP at its peak in 2007-08. In the debt market, while 
public issues of bonds fell after 2004-05 and remained muted 
throughout the boom period, private placement of corporate debt 
increased since 2005-06 and reached 3% of GDP in 2008-09 (Chart 
1.7.c).  
 
Private placement of corporate debt has continued to rise even in the 
aftermath of the boom period. There has been a policy thrust on 
deepening the market for corporate bonds and securitised debt since 
the mid-2000s (GoI, 2005).6 It can be seen though that during the 
boom period, resource mobilisation from the equity and debt markets 
by the private corporate sector never crossed 4% of GDP. 
																																								 																				
5 See World Bank and IMF (2005).  
6 A High Level Expert Committee on Corporate Bonds and Securitisation formed 
after announcement in Budget 2005-06 submitted its report in December 2005, 
making several recommendations to develop the primary and secondary market for 
corporate debt (GoI 2005). The Government accepted its recommendations and 
initiated implementation from 2006-07.  
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Chart 1.7.a: Average Annual Market Capitalisation of BSE  
(% of GDP) 
 
 
Chart 1.7.b:	New Capital Issues By Non-Government Public Limited 
Companies (% of GDP) 
 
 
Chart 1.7.c:	Private Placement of Corporate Debt 
(% of GDP) 
 
Source: (a, b) Source: RBI, Database on Indian Economy 
 (c) PRIME Database 
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The most crucial role in financing the boom in the real economy was 
played by the scheduled commercial banks. The banking sector 
reforms initiated in the early 1990s following the recommendations of 
the Narasimham Committee-I sought to deregulate interest rates, 
reduce the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) and cash reserve ratio 
(CRR) and also dilute the norms of priority sector lending. All this 
was meant to reduce the share of the government and sectors like 
agriculture and small scale industries in bank credit and enhance the 
share of the private corporate sector. However, despite the reduction 
of the SLR from 38.5% in 1992 to 25% in 1997 and the CRR from 
15% in 1992 to 4.5% by 2003, the scheduled commercial banks raised 
their holding of government securities throughout the late 1990s even 
with growing deposits, leading to a fall in the credit-deposit ratio 
from an annual average of 65% in the 1980s to 55% in the 1990s 
(Charts 1.8.a & b). This was attributed to risk aversion on the part 
of the banks in lending to the private commercial sector as well as 
the relative attractiveness of government securities in terms of 
returns (Chandrasekhar and Pal, 2006).  
This trend reversed with the commencement of the economic boom 
with the the credit-deposit ratio rising and investments in 
government securities falling from 2004-05. The credit-deposit ratio 
maintained an annual average of around 74% since 2004-05, with the 
credit-GDP ratio rising from around 30% in 2003-04 to almost 53% in 
2013-14. 
Chart 1.8.a: Scheduled Commercial Banks: Credit-Deposit Ratio 
 
Source: RBI, Database on Indian Economy 
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Chart 1.8.b: Scheduled Commercial Banks: Deposits, Credit and 
Investment (% of GDP) 
Source: RBI, Database on Indian Economy 
 
The sharp and unprecedented rise in bank credit in the 2000s occured 
alongside a gradual decline in the lending rates of the commercial 
banks. The weighted average lending rates of all scheduled 
commercial banks declined gradually from around 17% in 1995-96 to 
13% in 2003-04. Due to a larger fall in the inflation rates in the late 
1990s, however, the real interst rates rose during this period and 
remained over 10% between 1999-2002 (Charts 1.9.a & b). With 
inflation rising from 2003-04 and lending rates continuing its 
declining trend, real interest rates fell significantly and reached 
around 2.5% in 2010-11. With the inflation rate touching almost 
double digits by 2010-11, the declining trend of nominal lending rates 
was reversed also leading to a rise in the real lending rates.  
A broadly similar movement can be seen in the benchmark prime 
lending rate of the State Bank of India (SBI), the largest commercial 
bank in India. SBI’s nominal PLR had fallen from 15.8% in 1995-96 
to 12% in 1999-00, and further to 10.3% in 2004-05, driving down the 
real lending rate from around 9% in 1999-00 to 4.5% in 2004-05 
(Chart 1.9.c). This decline in the nominal and real lending rates in 
the early 2000s resulted from the accommodative policy stance of the 
monetary authorities during this period, with the policy rate cut from 
8% in March 2002 to 6.25% by October 2005. Another phase of 
monetary easing was witnessed during the post-crisis period, with the 
policy rate being cut from 9% in July 2008 to 4.75% in April 2009, 
which found reflection in the decline of nominal and real lending 
rates between 2008-2011.      
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Chart 1.9.a: Sectorwise Weighted Average Lending Rates of  
Scheduled Commercial Banks and Average Inflation Rate (%) 
 
 
Chart 1.9.b: Weighted Average Real Lending Rates of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks (%) 
 
Chart 1.9.c: Benchmark Prime Lending Rate of the SBI – 
Nominal and Real (%) 
 
Source: (a, b) RBI, Database on Indian Economy; (c) SBI Benchmark 
Prime Lending Rate (Historical Data), SBI Corporate Website 
Note: GDP Deflator calculated from GDP data on current and constant prices 
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Flow of Bank Credit 
In examining the contribution of bank credit in the economic boom 
of the 2000s, we have estimated the bank group wise and sector wise 
annual flow of credit in the post-reform period. The annual flow of 
credit was estimated as the change in annual stocks of outstanding 
credit from the data on occupation-wise classification of outstanding 
credit published by the RBI in Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks in India. The credit flow data reflects the 
injection of new credit in the economy. 
 
Chart 1.10.a: Annual Credit Flow of Scheduled Commercial 
Banks & GDPmp  
(in Rs. Billion) 
 
Source: Calculated from RBI, Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks in India & Database on Indian Economy  
 
Chart 1.10.b: Annual Credit Flow of Scheduled Commercial Banks (% 
of GDP) 
 
Source: Calculated from RBI, Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks in India & Database on Indian Economy 
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Annual flow of bank credit jumped from Rs. 1.2 trillion in 2003-04 to 
Rs. 2.7 trillion in 2004-05, i.e. from around 4.4% to 8.4% of nominal 
GDP (Charts 1.10.a & b). This significant injection of new credit 
coincided with the growth acceleration witnessed from 2003-04. 
During the phase of accelerated growth between 2005-2008, annual 
credit flow averaged at over 9.7% of GDP. The rate of credit flow 
came down from 2008-09 but have averaged at around 7.7% annually 
since then till 2013-14. The share of industry in new credit had a 
declining trend in the 1990s, with the services sector enhancing its 
share significantly in the late 1990s (Chart 1.11). There was also a 
spurt in personal loans between 2002-2006, with over 50% of new 
credit in 2003-04 going into personal loans.  
Chart 1.11: Sectoral Share in Annual Credit Flow of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks (%) 
 
Source: Calculated from RBI, Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks in India  
Chart 1.12: Sectoral Share in Annual Credit Flow of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Calculated from RBI, Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks in India & Database on Indian Economy 
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From 2004-05, however, the share of the industrial sector in new 
credit has been the highest among all sectors, averaging around 42% 
(the 1990s average was 47%), followed by services averaging around 
27%. The share of personal loans in new credit has averaged around 
13% since 2006-07. The share of agriculture in new credit, increased 
from an average of 8% in the 1990s to 12% in the 2000s. The jump in 
credit flow witnessed in 2004-05 was led by new credit to industry 
increasing from less than 1% of GDP in 2003-04 to almost 3.5% of 
GDP in 2004-05 (Chart 1.12). Since 2004-05, new credit to industry 
and services have averaged at around 3.5% and 2.4% of GDP 
respectively, while personal loans which rose to above 2% of GDP 
between 2002-06 averaged around 1% since 2006-07.      
Chart 1.13: Bankgroupwise Annual Credit Flow  
(% of GDP) 
 
Source: Calculated from RBI, Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks in India & Database on Indian Economy 
Among bankgroups, the public sector banks (PSBs) have clearly led 
the surge in credit since 2004-05, with new credit from PSBs 
averaging around 6.7% of GDP between 2004-2011 (Chart 1.13). It is 
noteworthy that while new credit from the private sector banks and 
foreign banks fell in the immediate aftermath of the global financial 
crisis in 2007-08, the PSBs in India had continued to lend at a 
frenetic pace. For both the industrial and services sectors, the public 
sector banks were the providers of the bulk of new credit since 2004-
05 (Charts 1.14.a & b).   
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Chart 1.14.a: Bankgroupwise Annual Credit Flow to Industry (% of 
GDP) 
 
  
Chart 1.14.b: Bankgroupwise Annual Credit Flow to Servies (% of 
GDP) 
 
 
Chart 1.14.c: Bankgroupwise Annual Flow of Personal Loans  
(% of GDP) 
 
Source: (a, b, c) Calculated from RBI, Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks in India & Database on Indian Economy 
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The PSBs also had the dominant share in personal loans (new 
credit), but the share of private sector banks in personal loans was 
much higher than their share in credit to industry and services 
(Chart 1.14.c). The rise in peronal loans from 2002-03 was on account 
of lending by both the PSBs and private sector banks.   
The significant difference in the rates of new credit flow to industry 
and services between the PSBs and private sector banks from 2004-05 
is quite striking. Industrial financing in India till the 1990s used to be 
dominated by the Development Financial Institutions (DFIs), which 
specialised in long-term project financing. The Narasimham 
Committee-II set up to further the banking sector reforms agenda, 
called for a phasing out of the DFIs in its report submitted in 1998. 
ICICI was the first DFI to convert into an universal bank in 2002. 
Upholding the ‘successful’ transformation of the ICICI, RBI’s 
Working Group on DFIs set up in 2004, made the following 
observations (RBI, 2004): 
In view of the banking system having acquired the skills 
of managing risks in extending finance to different 
sectors of the economy including long term finance and 
the capital market (both equity and debt taken together) 
providing significantly larger resources to the corporate 
sector, the need for DFIs as the exclusive providers of 
development finance has diminished. The banks may be 
encouraged to extend high risk project finance with 
suitable Government support with a view to distributing 
risks and funding sources as also developing appropriate 
credit appraisals and monitoring skills across the 
financial system. (emphasis added) 
RBI (2004) further argued that the business model of the DFIs have 
become unviable in a context where interest rates have been 
deregulated. The rising cost of funds and the very long-term maturity 
of their loans was seen to be exposing the DFIs to high credit risks 
and leading to accumulation of NPAs, which made them crucially 
dependent on the government’s financial support. It was thus 
prescribed that only a handful of DFIs should be continued with 
central government support and the rest of the DFIs converted to 
either banks or NBFCs, as per the recommendations of the 
Narasimham Committee-II. Subsequently, most DFIs were gradually 
eliminated and the larger ones like the IDBI and UTI converted into 
commercial banks, following the ICICI.  
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Chart 1.15: DFIs Annual Disbursements and PSBs Annual Credit 
Flow to Industry & Services (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Calculated from RBI, Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks in India  
& Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 
The demise of the DFIs since the early 2000s, which resulted from a 
such a policy shift, created a void in financing the private corporate 
sector, which the PSBs were ‘encouraged’ to fill through syndicated 
lending. As annual disbursements from DFIs fell from 3.5% of GDP 
in 2000-01 to 0.66% of GDP in 2004-05, new credit from PSBs 
increased from 1.6% of GDP to 4.5% during the same period (Chart 
1.15). The residual DFI disbursements that have continued after 
2003-04 are almost entirely accounted for by LIC and SIDBI.7 The 
dismantling of development finance and the reliance on the public 
sector banking system to fuel credit growth in industry and services 
during the boom in the 2000s had perverse implications in the 
medium-term. We shall turn to those consequences in the following 
chapter. 
																																								 																				
7 See Nayyar (2015) for a more detailed analysis of DFI disbursements in India. 
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Chapter 2 
Internal Dimension: Bad Loans Crisis 
 
In a speech made in November 2014 the RBI Governor rang the 
alarm bells on the growing corporate debt defaults afflicting the 
banking system and resources being frittered away through debt 
write-offs. The Governor identified the problem in what he 
characterised as ‘riskless capitalism’ being enjoyed by large promoters 
of businesses in India (Rajan 2004):  
...the sanctity of the debt contract has been 
continuously eroded in India in recent years, not by 
small borrower but by the large borrower. And this has 
to change if we are to get banks to finance the 
enormous infrastructure needs and industrial growth 
that this country aims to attain. The reality is that too 
many large borrowers see the lender, typically a bank, 
as holding not a senior debt claim that overrides all 
other claims when the borrower gets into trouble, but a 
claim junior to his equity claim. 
...Risk taking inevitably means the possibility of 
default. An economy where there is no default is an 
economy where promoters and banks are taking too 
little risk. What I am warning against is the uneven 
sharing of risk and returns in enterprise, against all 
contractual norms established the world over – where 
promoters have a class of ‘super’ equity which retains 
all the upside in good times and very little of the 
downside in bad times, while creditors, typically public 
sector banks, hold ‘junior’ debt and get none of the fat 
returns in good times while absorbing much of the 
losses in bad times. 
...Faced with this asymmetry of power, banks are 
tempted to cave in and take the unfair deal the 
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borrower offers. The bank’s debt becomes junior debt 
and the promoter’s equity becomes super equity. The 
promoter enjoys riskless capitalism – even in these 
times of very slow growth, how many large promoters 
have lost their homes or have had to curb their 
lifestyles despite offering personal guarantees to 
lenders? 
...Who pays for this one way bet large promoters enjoy? 
Clearly, the hard working savers and taxpayers of this 
country! As just one measure, the total write-offs of 
loans made by the commercial banks in the last five 
years is 161018 crore, which is 1.27% of GDP.   
Stressed Loans  
Such admission of a systemic malaise came from the higher echelons 
of the policy establishment amidst a sharp decline in bank 
profitability in 2013-14, which led to a slowdown credit growth 
(Table 2.1). Annual growth of bank credit, which had risen from an 
annual average of around 15% in the 1990s to above 22% in the 
2000s — crossing 30% between 2004-2007 — nosedived to around 
9.7% in 2014-15 and further down to 9.4% in the first half of 2015-16.  
 
Table 2.1: Annual Growth in Credit and Profits of SCBs 
(%) 
 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16: H1 
(Sept. 2015) 
Credit 
Growth 
22.9 18.1 15.9 14.5 9.7 9.4 
Profit (after 
Tax) Growth 
23.6 14.6 12.9 -14.1 10.1 -4.4 
Source: RBI, Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India  
& Financial Stability Report, December 2015 
 
 
 
	27 
 
Table 2.2: Bankgroupwise Return on Assets (RoA) (%)  
 
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 
All SCBs 1.1 1.1 1 0.8 0.8 
Nationalised Banks  
(Including IDBI) -  - 
 
0.80 
0.45 0.37 
SBI Group - - 0.63 0.66 
Private Banks - - 1.63 1.65 1.68 
Foreign Banks - - 1.92 1.54 1.87 
Source: RBI, Financial Stability Report, December 2015  
& Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, 2014-15   
The fall in overall bank credit growth occurred despite private and 
foreign banks maintaining a much higher credit growth rate, because 
credit growth for the PSBs fell very sharply to around 7.3% by end-
March 2015. PSBs excluding the SBI Group witnessed a significant 
fall in their RoA from 0.45% in 2013-14 to 0.37% in 2014-15, 
although the SBI Group, the private sector banks and foreign banks 
witnessed increases in their RoAs in 2014-15 (Table 2.2). Higher 
provisions for non-performing loans (NPAs) and write-offs of bad 
loans have been the main reason behind the falling profitability of 
the PSBs, besides slower earnings growth owing to the economic 
slowdown. Given the enhanced share of PSBs in credit growth during 
the boom, they have been saddled with a much higher share of NPAs 
within the banking system.  
Chart 2.1: SCBs Gross Advances & Stressed Advances (left axis) 
(in Rs. Billion) 
 
Source: RBI, Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India  
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Chart 2.2: Bankgroupwise Ratio of Stressed Advances in Gross 
Advances (%) 
 
Source: RBI, Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India  
The accumulation of bad debts in the banking system accelerated 
from 2011-12, with the end of the boom period (Charts 2.1 & 2.2). In 
order to keep their NPA ratios down, banks started restructuring 
massive amounts of corporate debt, with the stock of restructured 
advances surpassing that of the NPAs. The overall stressed advances 
to gross advances ratio for all banks, including declared NPAs and 
restructured advances, rose from around 4% in 2010-11 to above 11% 
in 2014-15. With the banking system’s gross advances amounting to 
Rs. 75 trillion in 2014-15, stressed advances stood at Rs. 8.4 trillion 
in March 2015, of which Rs. 7.55 trillion were with the PSBs. While 
PSBs accounted for around 74% of all SCBs’ gross advances, they 
had a share of almost 90% of the total stressed advances of the 
banking system. Among the PSBs, the SBI group’s ratio of stressed 
advances to gross advances was at 10.5% in 2014-15 while that of 
other nationalised banks at a much higher level of 14.8% (Chart 2.3).       
Chart 2.3: PSBs Stressed Advances in Gross Advances (%) 
SBI & Nationalised Banks 
 
Source: RBI, Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India  
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The increase in stressed loans of the PSBs from 2011-12 have been 
driven by increases in the NPAs from the non-priority sector and the 
restructured advances (Chart 2.4). The priority sector and public 
sector units (PSUs) have not witnessed any rise in their NPA ratios. 
Thus, almost the entire bad loans crisis faced by the PSBs can be 
attributed to credit extended to the private corporate sector. This 
explains the RBI Governor’s castigation of ‘riskless capitalism’, 
whereby the losses made by the private corporate sector after the end 
of the boom period have been offloaded on to the public sector banks.   
Chart 2.4: PSBs Stressed Advances in Gross Advances: 
Priority & Non-Priority Sectors(%) 
 
Source: RBI, Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India  
Debt Stress: Sectoral Decomposition 
RBI’s (2015) Financial Stability Report provided information on the 
sectoral composition of the stressed loans (Table 2.3). Five sectors, 
namely mining, iron & steel, textiles, infrastructure and aviation, 
which accounted for almost 25% of gross advances of the banking 
system, contributed over 51% of the stressed advances. Infrastructure 
with a 15% share in gross advances contributed almost 30% of 
stressed advances while iron & steel with 4.5% share in gross 
advances contributed 10.2% of stressed advances. Within the 
infrastructure sector, power and telecom were the major absorbers of 
credit as well as contributors to debt stress.        
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Table 2.3: Sectoral Composition of Stressed Advances (%) 
(December 2014) 
Sub-Sector  PSBs 
Private  
Banks 
Foreign 
 Banks 
All  
SCBs 
1. Mining Share in Advances 1.7 0.4 0.4 1.3 
Share in Stressed 
Advances 1.4 1.1 0.3 1.4 
2. Iron & Steel Share in Advances 5.2 2.5 2.7 4.5 
Share in Stressed 
Advances 10.5 7.9 3.6 10.2 
3. Textiles Share in Advances 3.9 2.4 1.2 3.4 
Share in Stressed 
Advances 7.5 6.4 3.4 7.3 
4. Infrastructure  
                     
(of which) 
Share in Advances 17.6 8.4 6.4 15 
Share in Stressed 
Advances 30.9 18.2 32.8 29.8 
Power Generation Share in Advances 10.1 3.8 1.1 8.3 
Share in Stressed 
Advances 17.3 7.3 0 16.1 
Telecom Share in Advances 1.7 0.9 3.2 1.6 
Share in Stressed 
Advances 1.8 3.1 19.7 2.2 
5. Aviation Share in Advances 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.5 
Share in Stressed 
Advances 2.7 0.4 0 2.4 
Total of these five 
sub-sectors (1 to 
5) 
Share in Advances 29 13.9 11.3 24.8 
Share in Stressed 
Advances 53.1 34.1 40 51.1 
Source: RBI, Financial Stability Report, June 2015  
The high contribution of the infrastructure and iron & steel sectors 
to the stressed advances of the banking system point towards 
excessive bank lending to these sectors during the period of the 
boom. It is also noteworthy that while infrastructure and iron & steel 
comprised of almost 23% of gross advances of the PSBs, their share 
in gross advances of the private banks and foreign banks were 11% 
and 9% respectively.  
Outstanding credit to the infrastructure sector was Rs. 31.6 billion in 
March 1998, from when data for this sector has been made available 
by the RBI. This had risen to over Rs. 241 billion in March 2002, by 
the end of the Ninth Plan period. By the end of the Tenth Plan 
period in March 2007, this stood at around Rs. 1.4 trillion. At the 
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end of the Eleventh Plan period in March 2012, outstanding credit to 
infrastructure was at Rs. 6.2 trillion, which further increased to Rs. 
8.3 trillion by March 2014. This substantial increase in infrastructure 
credit was mainly on account of credit to the power sector, followed 
by roads & ports and telecommunications (Chart 2.5).  
Chart 2.5: Gross Credit Outstanding in Infrastructure  
(in Rs. Billion) 
 
Source: RBI, Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy  
Chart 2.6: Flow of Credit to Infrastructure  
(% of GDP) 
 
      Source: Calculated from RBI, Basic Statistical Returns of 
Scheduled Commercial Banks in India  
& Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 
Annual flow of credit to the infrastructure sector rose from around 
0.3% of GDP in 2002-03 to 1.1% of GDP in 2005-06 and peaked at 
1.8% of GDP in 2010-11 (Chart 2.6). Average annual flow of 
infrastructure credit was 1.4% of GDP between 2007-08 and 2011-12, 
i.e. the period of the Eleventh Plan. This needs to be seen in the 
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context of the thrust given to investment in infrastructure and PPPs 
in the Eleventh Plan, which we noted in the preceding chapter while 
discussing the enhanced role of private investment in the growth 
process during the 2000s. 
The Eleventh Five-year Plan projected an increase in infrastructure 
investment from around 5% of GDP in the Tenth Plan period to 
7.6% of GDP in the Eleventh Plan period, with the share of private 
investment in total infrastructure investment projected to rise from 
20% to 30% (Planning Commission, 2008). 48% of financing for the 
investment in infrastructure was expected to flow from debt sources, 
with the rest being financed from the budgetary resources of the 
central and state governments, IEBR’s of public enterprises and 
through equity and internal accruals of the private corporate sector. 
Around 51% of debt was expected to be contributed by the 
commercial banking sector with the rest of debt finance coming from 
NBFCs, Insurance Companies, Pension funds and ECBs, with a 
likely “funding gap” of Rs. 16.2 billion (2006-07 prices) for the entire 
plan period. 
A crucial element in the financing plan for infrastructure investments 
in the Eleventh Plan was that while 40% of public investment was to 
be financed with debt, for private investment the debt/non-debt 
finance ratio was almost 7:3. This had in fact been the typical 
gearing ratio for PPP infrastructure projects in India. A study 
conducted by the Pricewaterhouse Coopers for the World Bank 
(PwC, 2007) on PPP Infrastructure Projects in India, covering the 
detailed financials of 104 projects worth $11.48 billion, came out with 
the following findings: 
v 68% of the project cost is usually financed by debt, 26% 
percent by promoter’s equity while only 2% comes from sub-
debt; Remaining 4% comes from Government grants of 
different kinds. 
v Out of the debt financing of $ 7.7 billion, 72% can be 
attributed to term loans from commercial banks; Players like 
IIFCL (34.4%), IDFC (22%) and IDBI (17.3%) dominate in 
the funding from non-bank sources of debt.8 
																																								 																				
8 IDBI was considered as a financial institution in the report and not as a bank.  
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v Within bank lending, public sector banks dominate with a 
share of 82%, while the share of private sector banks and 
foreign banks are only 13% and 5% respectively.  
Given such funding pattern for PPP projects, the projection of bank 
credit requirements made in the Eleventh Plan, amounting to 51% of 
total debt finance requirements, were under-estimates. Restrictions 
on insurance companies and pension funds like the EPFO prevented 
them from lending to infrastructure projects, which do not have high 
credit ratings. RBI norms set limits on raising ECBs for financing or 
refinancing infrastructure projects. The IIFCL, an infrastructure 
finance company set up by the government in 2006 to provide long-
term finance to infrastructure projects, had till December 2015 made 
cumulative disbursements of Rs. 47000 crore only, under direct 
lending, takeout finance and refinance schemes taken together, which 
is a miniscule fraction of the Rs. 9.2 trillion outstanding bank credit 
to the infrastructure sector in March 2015. The bulk of the burden of 
financing infrastructure investments, especially private investments, 
therefore had to be borne by the commercial banks, particularly the 
PSBs.     
Table 2.4: Infrastructure: Private Investment and Credit 
Flow in X & XI Plan (% of GDP) 
  X Plan (2002-03 to 2006-07) XI Plan (2007-08 to 2011-12) 
 (% of GDP) 
Total 
Investment 
Private 
Investment 
Credit 
Flow 
Total 
Investment 
Private 
Investment 
Credit 
Flow 
Power 1.51 0.38 0.34 2.40 1.13 0.74 
Telecom 0.79 0.52 0.10 1.15 0.89 0.24 
Roads, Bridges 
& Ports 0.96 0.17 0.12 1.48 0.38 0.26 
Total 
Infrastructure  5.02 1.11 0.68 7.18 2.61 1.42 
 (%)   
Private 
Investment/ 
Total 
Investment 
Credit 
Flow/ 
Total 
Investment 
 
Private 
Investment/ 
Total 
Investment 
Credit 
Flow/ 
Total 
Investment 
Power   25.2 22.6 
 
47.0 30.9 
Telecom   65.0 12.6 
 
77.8 20.9 
Roads, Bridges 
& Ports   18.1 12.5 
 
25.5 17.6 
Total 
Infrastructure    22.0 13.5 
 
36.3 19.8 
Source: Calculated from Planning Commission, Twelfth Plan Document 
& Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 
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While preparing the Twelfth Plan, the Planning Commission (2013) 
estimated that the share of private investment in total investment 
turned out to be 36% by the end of the Eleventh Plan period, 
overshooting the projected share of 30% (noted in Table 1.4 in the 
previous chapter). With private investment in infrastructure rising 
from 1.1% of GDP in the Tenth Plan to 2.6% of GDP in the 
Eleventh Plan period, credit flow to infrastructure also rose from 
0.7% of GDP to 1.4% of GDP.9 Such increases in private investment 
and credit flow can be seen in the sub-sectors like power, telecom, 
roads & bridges and ports. This debt-financed expansion of private 
investment in infrastructure from 2007-08 coincided with the global 
slowdown following the financial crisis, and prolonged the 
expansionary phase in India till 2011-12.  
We have already noted that such high levels of private investments 
could not be sustained in the Twelfth Plan, with actual investment in 
infrastructure in 2012-13 falling short of projected estimates by 66%. 
The shortfall in private investment in infrastructure in 2012-13 was 
by a much higher level of 74%. The fall of total infrastructure 
investment to GDP, from 7.2% between 2007-12 to 5.1% in 2012-13 
and 5.3% in 2013-14 prompted the High Level Committee on 
Financing Infrastructure to revise the total projection for 
infrastructure investment to GDP during the Twelfth Plan period 
from 8.2% to 5.7%. The following observation was made by the 
Committee (Planning Commission, 2014):      
...the policy environment has become increasingly 
difficult on account of various factors such as 
inadequate allocation of fuel to power stations, delays in 
environment and forest clearances, issues in land 
acquisition, constraints in bank lending, economic 
slowdown and delays in decision-making, which are the 
principal causes of decline in investment in 
infrastructure, especially during the last two years. The 
																																								 																				
9 Planning Commission (2013) did not provide data on the financing of realized 
infrastructure investment during the Eleventh Plan, including bank credit. The 
data on credit to infrastructure have been obtained from the RBI database. The 
definitions of the Infrastructure sector and its sub-sectors are different for the RBI 
and the Planning Commission. We have compared the investment and credit data 
only where the definitions match closely. Given the scale of private investments 
made during the Eleventh Plan period, the infrastructure credit data provided by 
the RBI appear to be under-estimates.    
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Committee noted that if the above constraints are not 
addressed urgently, they would lead to a widening of 
the infrastructure deficit with serious repercussions for 
the economy in the years to come.  
Thus, two sets of issues were flagged by the High Level Committee in 
explaining the slowdown in infrastructure investments: (i) delays in 
policy level decision-making and regulatory clearances (ii) constraints 
on bank lending and the economic slowdown. Estimates made from 
the CMIE Capex database, however, shows that the ‘dropping rate’ 
of investment projects in the private sector has grown much more 
sharply than that of projects in the public sector during the recent 
slowdown (Chart 2.7). 	
Chart 2.7: Dropping Rate of Investment Projects (%) 
(Dropped Projects as a share of Projects Under Implementation) 	
	
Source: CMIE, CapEx Database  
While the private sector always had a much higher rate of dropped 
projects than the public sector, the difference had narrowed during 
the boom period, reflecting conducive market and credit conditions. 
With an overhang of corporate debt and bad loans accumulating in 
bank balance sheets since 2011-12, the rate of dropped projects have 
increased much more sharply in the private sector. The highest rates 
of dropped projects are to be seen in sectors like manufacturing, IT 
and power (Chart 2.8).  
 
 
 
 
	36 
 
Chart 2.8: Selected Sectors: Dropping Rate of Investment 
Projects (%) 
(Dropped Projects as a share of Projects Under Implementation) 	
 
Source: CMIE, CapEx Database  
The Economic Survey (GoI, 2015a) carried out an elaborate study of 
stalled projects and noted that most of the stalled private projects 
were in manufacturing and infrastructure, while the stalled 
government projects were predominantly in infrastructure. The 
Survey made the following relevant observation: 
Perhaps contrary to popular belief, the evidence points 
towards over exuberance and a credit bubble as 
primary reasons (rather than lack of regulatory 
clearances) for stalled projects in the private sector. On 
the flipside, government projects were the most severely 
affected by ‘policy paralysis’ of regulatory clearances. 
There are of course interdependencies, but a private 
sector ‘project bubble’ is not inconsistent with the data. 
Noting that the stock market has not been much affected by such 
stalling of projects, the Survey showed through an event study that 
the stalling of projects did not have any significant impact on firm 
equity, which may be because ‘the market is internalising the 
expectations of bailouts’. 
Credit Bubble 
In order to further examine the quality of credit to the non-financial 
corporate sector during the boom phase of the 2000s, we have 
conducted analysis based on non-financial companies’ data from the 
CMIE Prowess Database. The debt-equity ratio (DER) and the 
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interest coverage ratio (ICR) are standard indicators of corporate 
leverage, with the former indicating the proportion of the aggregate 
debt stock in companies’ net worth and the latter indicating solvency 
status. The time-series of the average interest coverage ratio 
(EBITDA/interest payments) and the average debt-equity ratio for 
the entire database of non-financial companies are given below 
(Chart 2.9 & 2.10).  
Chart 2.9: Average Interest Coverage Ratio of Non-
Financial Companies 
 
Source: Calculated from CMIE, Prowess Database  
Chart 2.10: Average Debt Equity Ratio of Non-Financial 
Companies 
 
Source: Calculated from CMIE, Prowess Database  
The average ICR of the non-financial sector improved considerably 
from March-1999 till end-March 2008 and started declining 
thereafter, reflecting the worsening financial and economic conditions 
after the global financial crisis. The average DE ratio rose during the 
late-1990s, then fell from 2003 to 2008 and showed an upward trend 
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since 2009. The average DE ratio has fallen from 1.4 in end-March 
2014 to 1.2 in end-March 2015. The average ICR and DER of the 
private non-financial companies are higher than that of the public 
sector and other companies.   
Chart 2.11: DER>5 Companies Debt in Total Debt (%) 
	 
Source: Calculated from CMIE, Prowess Database  
Chart 2.12: DER>5 Companies Borrowings in Total Bank 
Borrowings (%) 
 
Source: Calculated from CMIE, Prowess Database  
Chart 2.11 plots over time the annual share of the outstanding debt 
of private non-financial companies with high debt-equity ratio 
(DER>5) in total outstanding debt of all non-financial companies. 
The share of DER>5 debt rose continuously from the end-1990s till 
2001-02. With the boom in the 2000s, the share of high DER 
companies in total debt fell between 2003 and 2008. The share 
started rising again from 2009 and has reached a peak of 17% by end-
March 2015. The decline of DFI debt and rise in bank debt from 
2003-04 can within the total debt of high debt companies can also be 
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seen. Chart 2.12 shows that the share of DER>5 companies bank 
borrowings in total bank borrowings (of all non-financial companies) 
rising from 6.4% in 2007-08 to 17% in 2014-2015. This clearly shows 
that banks were lending more to high debt companies since the 
global financial crisis.  
A similar trend can be seen vis-a-vis the share of bank borrowings by 
private non-financial companies with ICR<1 in total bank 
borrowings. For a company with ICR<1 in a period implies that its 
net earnings (EBITDA) are less than interest payments, signifying 
negative cash flow. The share of bank borrowings by such companies 
in total bank borrowings fell from 6.7% in 2001-02 to 3.7% in 2006-
07, then rose again to 7.7% in 2008-09, fell to 4.7% in 2010-11 and 
rose again to peak at 12.2% in 2012-13. Stock of bank credit with 
ICR<1 companies was at the highest levels between end-March 2012 
to 2014.  
Chart 2.13: ICR<1 Companies’ Borrowings in Total Bank 
Borrowings (%) 
 
 Source: Calculated from CMIE, Prowess Database  
The sectoral shares of companies with DER>5 and ICR<1 are 
provided in Table 2.5 with a ranking based on their share of total 
DER>5 and ICR<1 borrowings in end-March 2015. The iron & steel 
sector had the highest share of debt among the outstanding bank 
borrowings of all DER>5 companies, followed by the power and civil 
engineering sector (which fall under infrastructure) and warehousing. 
Among ICR<1 companies, the largest share was of the power sector, 
followed by warehousing, civil engineering and textiles. These broadly 
follow the pattern of sectors with high NPAs and stressed loans, as 
reported by the RBI.  
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Table 2.5: Sectoral Shares of DER> 5 and ICR<1 
Companies (%) End-March 2015  
Sectors 
% Share in 
DER>5 
Bank 
Borrowing  Sectors 
% Share 
in ICR<1 
Bank 
Borrowing 
Iron and steel 28.7 
Electricity 
(infrastructure) 21.6 
Electricity (infrastructure) 21.6 
Warehousing and 
support activities for 
transportation 11.7 
Civil engineering 
(infrastructure) 12.6 
Civil engineering 
(infrastructure) 10.9 
Warehousing and support 
activities for transportation 5.1 Textiles 8.6 
Transport equipment 3.1 Motor vehicles 6.7 
Machinery and equipment 3.1 Iron and steel 5.0 
Electrical equipment 2.8 
Non-metallic mineral 
products 3.8 
Non-metallic mineral 
products 2.5 
Telecommunications 
(infrastructure) 3.3 
Telecommunications 
(infrastructure) 2.4 Pharmaceuticals 3.1 
Chemicals and chemical 
products 2.1 Basic metals 2.7 
Total 83.9 Total 77.4 
Source: Calculated from CMIE, Prowess Database  
 
In order to take a closer look at the deterioration of the quality of 
credit, we examine the share of companies with ICR<1 at the end of 
the previous year in the annual flow of bank credit. An increasing 
share implies a worsening of credit quality. For this we identify a 
sample of 1445 companies from the Prowess database, which have 
provided complete data on bank borrowings, EBITDA and interest 
payments for the time-period 2001-02 to 2014-15. Chart 2.14 below 
shows the share of ICR<1 companies in the sample within the 
annual flow of credit to all the companies in the sample.     
 
	 	There were sharp deteriorations in the quality of credit to the non-
financial sector in two phases, when the share of ICR<1 companies 
in total credit flow increased sharply. The first phase was between 
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2001-02 and 2004-05 when the share rose from 1% to 15.2%. This 
was when the 2000s boom had commenced. The share came down 
significantly in 2005-06 and remained below 5% till 2008-09 and 
turned negative in 2009-10, signifying deleveraging. There was a 
reversal in 2010-11, when the share of ICR<1 companies in credit 
flow jumped to 16% and then, after falling in 2011-12, had once 
again risen from 2012-13 to peak at 27% in 2013-14. The period 
between 2011-14 was therefore another phase when credit quality 
deteriorated significantly, and certainly experienced a credit bubble. 
Chart 2.14: Share of ICR<1 Companies in Annual Flow of 
Credit (%) 
	
	 	 	
	
Source: Calculated from CMIE, Prowess Database  
It is noteworthy that while ICR<1 companies in the first decile of 
our sample explain most of the credit flow till 2008-09, the spikes 
after 2008-09 are on account of credit flow to ICR<1 companies in 
the first percentile. This reflects the concentration of credit within 
the ICR<1 companies.  
Table 2.6 provides the list of the first percentile companies in our 
sample and ranks them in terms of their net bank borrowings in 
2013-14, the year with the highest share of net bank borrowings to 
ICR<1 companies. Out of the 14 companies, numbers 1 and 4 had 
ICR<1 at the end of 2012-13 and yet they could borrow Rs. 168.5 
billion and Rs. 49.5 billion respectively from the banks in 2013-14, 
accounting for almost 25% of net credit flow to all companies in our 
sample. Such large flows of bank credit to private companies already 
burdened with debt have aggravated the bad loans crisis.     
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Table 2.6: Net Bank Borrowings of Top Percentile 
Companies in 2013-14 (in Rs. Millions) 
Company Net bank Borrowings in 2013-14 
1. Reliance Industries Ltd. 168500.0 
2. Bhushan Steel Ltd. 68775.7 
3. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. 49488.6 
4. Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. 49488.6 
5. Essar Steel India Ltd. 34813.6 
6. Tata Steel Ltd. 31649.3 
7. Hindalco Industries Ltd. 31050.8 
8. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. 23288.5 
9. Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. 12762.3 
10. Tata Motors Ltd. 11639.2 
11. J S W Steel Ltd. -241.9 
12. Wipro Ltd. -4828.0 
13. Essar Oil Ltd. -9000.3 
14. Bharti Airtel Ltd. -12078.0 
Source: Calculated from CMIE, Prowess Database 
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Chapter 3 
External Dimension: Financial 
Globalisation and Vulnerability 
 
This chapter examines the outcome of India’s integration with the 
global economy in the context of financial globalisation, in terms of 
some standard metrics. Financial globalisation has broadly involved 
two inter-related processes. One is of ‘financial deepening’ in 
countries across the world with a rapid growth of financial assets 
indicated by a rise in the proportion of financial assets to GDP. The 
other is a significant increase in the quantum of cross border financial 
flows.  
International Balance Sheets 
According to an estimate (Mckinsey, 2013), the market value of the 
global stock of financial assets – equities, bonds and bank assets – 
which was around $12 trillion or 120% of world GDP at the end of 
1980 increased to $206 trillion by end-2007, amounting to 355% of 
world GDP. Cross-border capital flows increased from $0.5 trillion in 
1980 to reach $11.8 trillion in 2007. The pace of growth of financial 
assets and cross border flows had slowed down considerably in the 
immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008. However, 
the financial crisis and the subsequent recession did not lead to a 
reversal of the globalisation process. Rather, there was a surge in 
capital inflows to the so-called ‘emerging economies’ in the post-crisis 
period, leading to further financial deepening. The Indian economy 
has also been a recipient of significant capital inflows, both before 
and after the crisis.    
Table 3.1 provides a sectoral breakdown of the debt ratios (debt to 
GDP) of selected economies for end-2014, which indicates the 
financial depth of these economies. The data for total and sectoral 
credit to GDP have been extracted from the BIS database on credit 
to the non-financial sector. Net external debt assets and net foreign 
assets to GDP have been calculated from the updated External 
Wealth of Nations Mark II database. Developed economies include 
the US, Eurozone and Japan. We have ranked developing economies 
by their share in the global stock of foreign assets and liabilities and 
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selected the top fourteen developing economies which also report data 
to the BIS. This emerging economies group include China, Brazil, 
Russia, S.Korea, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, India, Turkey, Malaysia, 
South Africa, Poland, Indonesia, Thailand and Hungary. Data on 
India and China have been examined separately while the other 
emerging economies have been considered as a single group. 
Table 3.1: Sectoral Debt Ratios: Selected Economies (end-
2014)(% of GDP) 
 
Developed 
Economies 
Euro 
Area Japan 
United 
States of 
America 
Total Credit 275.1 271.2 393.2 250.1 
Credit to Government 117.5 106.1 222.3 100.9 
Credit to Non-Financial Private 
Sector 157.6 165.1 170.9 149.2 
 of which Non-Financial 
Corporations 85.9 103.3 104.9 69.2 
Net External Debt Assets -26.2 -13.3 22.3 -48.9 
Net Foreign Assets  -15.5 -8.5 65.7 -42.3 
 
Emerging 
Economies China India 
Emerging 
Economies  
(excluding 
India and 
China) 
Total Credit 172.8 234.2 126.2 118.7 
Credit to Government 41.9 41.2 66.6 37.7 
Credit to Non-Financial Private 
Sector 130.9 193.0 59.6 81.0 
 of which Non-Financial 
Corporations 100.2 156.9 50.3 51.7 
Net External Debt Assets -3.6 0.2 -20.4 -3.9 
Net Foreign Assets  10.0 14.4 -28.1 12.3 
Source: BIS, Total Credit to the Non-financial Sector & External 
Wealth of Nations Mark II Database10   
Among the developed economies, Japan has the highest total debt as 
well as the highest public and private sector debt ratios. The US and 
Eurozone have broadly similar debt ratios, with the public and 
private sector debt to GDP being somewhat higher in the Euro area 
compared to the US. China’s total debt-GDP in 2014 has reached 
levels comparable to the developed economies, mainly on account of 
its high private non-financial corporate debt-GDP, which is now the 
																																								 																				
10 See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). We are grateful to the authors for sharing 
their dataset (updated till 2014) with our project.   
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highest in the world. China’s public debt-GDP, however, remains 
moderate. Excluding China and India, the rest of the emerging 
economies in our sample, taken together, have a significantly lower 
total debt-GDP ratio compared to the developed economies. India’s 
public-debt to GDP ratio is higher while its corporate debt-GDP 
ratio is almost the same as that of other emerging economies. India’s 
private sector debt-GDP ratio, however, is at a much lower level 
compared to the other emerging economies because of the its low 
household debt-GDP ratio (difference between total private debt and 
corporate debt).11  
The US is the most financially integrated economy in the world with 
the largest share of foreign assets and liabilities in the global stock of 
foreign assets and liabilities. The net foreign assets position of the US 
is negative, reflecting its net debtor status. The Eurozone also has a 
net debtor status, while Japan has a positive net foreign assets 
position. China and the other emerging economies too have positive 
net foreign assets positions.12 India’s net foreign asset position is 
negative, mainly due to its negative external debt assets-GDP. 
India’s net external debt assets (negative) as a proportion of its total 
debt is also high, compared to the other emerging economies.    
Chart 3.1 plots the time-series of the net foreign assets positions for 
the selected economies. With financial globalisation, the stock of 
foreign assets and liabilities have grown over time, reflected in the 
growth of net foreign assets (NFA) to GDP ratio for all countries, 
either in the positive or negative direction. Japan has been the 
foremost international creditor for over three decades, while the US 
has been a net debtor since the late-1980s. The Eurozone has also 
been a net debtor but its NFA position has improved since the global 
financial crisis.         
																																								 																				
11 The household debt-GDP ratio for India, as reported by the BIS, includes only 
the personal loan component. RBI’s Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks in India provides organisational classification of outstanding 
SCB loans. The latest data for end-March 2015 shows total household sector 
outstanding bank credit at over 22% of GDP, while private corporate sector bank 
credit-GDP stood at around 20%. The discrepancy between BIS and RBI data 
arises out of the different definitions of the household and the private corporate 
sector.   
12 A few other emerging economies have negative net foreign asset positions, but 
here we consider the other emerging economies as a single group.   
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Chart 3.1: Net Foreign Assets Position – Selected 
Economies(% of GDP) 
 
Source: Calculated from External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database 
The emerging economies had experienced an improvement in their 
NFA positions from the late 1990s, with China’s positive NFA 
position peaking in 2008. While China’s NFA position has 
deteriorated since the outbreak of the global crisis, the other 
emerging economies group has improved its NFA position since 2011. 
India’s NFA position has always remained in negative territory since 
the 1980s, showing its net debtor status. However, there was an 
improvement in India’s NFA position between 1994 and 2004. Since 
then India’s NFA position has deteriorated again, especially since 
2011.  
Net foreign assets is the sum of net equity assets, net debt assets and 
foreign exchange reserve assets. Despite its overall net debtor status, 
the US is a net investor of equities, as can be seen from its positive 
net equity assets position (Chart 3.2). Japan too is a net equity 
investor. The Eurozone was a net recepient of equity assets till 2009, 
after which it has also turned into a net investor. The net equity 
asset positions of emerging economies, including India and China are 
negative, since they are all net recipients of equity investments. India 
and China are the most significant recipients of foreign equity 
investments among the emerging economies.  
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Chart 3.2: Net Equity Assets Position – Selected Economies 
(% of GDP) 
 
Source: Calculated from External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database 
Chart 3.3: Net Debt Assets Position – Selected Economies 
(% of GDP) 
 
Source: Calculated from External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database 
The net debt asset positions of the selected economies is similar to 
the trends of their net foreign assets positions (Chart 3.3). The US is 
the largest net debtor, while Japan the largest creditor. China has a 
positive net debt status implying that it is also a net creditor, 
although its net debt balance has deteriorated in the post-crisis 
period. The Eurozone, other emerging economies and India have been 
net debtors throughout the past three decades. However, while the 
net debt position of the Eurozone and other emerging economies have 
improved in recent times, India’s net debt position has deteriorated.  
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Emerging Economies 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) had observed a gradual improvement in the 
NFA positions of the emerging economies till the mid-2000s accompanied 
by a change in the structure of liabilities of the emerging economies, 
with the proportion of equity liabilities in total liabilities rising at the 
cost of debt liabilities over time. The increase in the share of equity 
liabilities was noted to have improved the risk profile of the emerging 
economies’ external balances. Sen Gupta and Sengupta (2016) makes 
a similar observation, commending the success of Indian policymakers 
in altering the composition of its external liabilities in favour of 
higher equity liabilities, by maintaining a hierarchy in the 
liberalisation of capital flows, according preference to non-debt 
creating inflows over debt inflows. This trend has, however, got 
reversed for India and China in the post-crisis period. The other 
emerging economies as a group has shown an improving trend, but 
individual countries within that group have also witnessed a 
deterioration of their NFA positions.  
Chart 3.4: India, China & Other Emerging Economies:  
External Debt & Equity Liabilities(% of GDP) 
 
Source: Calculated from External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database 
Chart 3.4 compares the movement of gross debt and equity liabilities 
of India, China and other emerging economies over time. There is a 
significant and continuous rise in the equity liabilities-GDP ratio for 
all emerging economies till 2007, accompanied by a fall in the 
external debt liabilities-GDP ratio, particularly in the early half of 
the 2000s. This has changed after the 2008 crisis. The sharp dip in 
equity liabilities in 2008 got reversed next year, but the stable rising 
trend of the pre-crisis phase did not resume. Rather, debt liabilities 
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have shown a rising trend in the post-crisis period, particularly for 
India and China. India’s debt-equity ratio of external liabilities has 
also been higher than the other emerging economies group since 2011 
(Chart 3.5).  
Chart 3.5: India, China & Other Emerging Economies:  
Debt to Equity Ratio of External Liabilities 
 
 
Source: Calculated from External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database 
Another noteworthy aspect is the difference in the composition of 
equity liabilities between India and other emerging economies as well 
as China (Charts 3.6.a, b & c). India’s equity liabilities have been 
dominated by foreign portfolio liabilities, which have overshadowed 
FDI liabilities since the early 2000s. Moreover, India’s FDI liabilities 
stock can be an overstimate, since definitional ambiguities regarding 
FDI in India has led to FPI inflows being considered as FDI (Rao 
and Dhar, 2011). China’s equity liabilities in contrast are dominated 
by FDI liabilities. For other emerging economies too, the share of 
FDI liabilities is higher than that of FPI liabilities.  
While the other emerging economies group has increased its outward 
investment significantly, as can be seen in the rise in their FDI and 
FPI assets especially in the 2000s, China and India have not seen an 
increase of foreign equity assets of a similar magnitude. China has 
been able to accumulate a huge amount of foreign exchange reserve 
assets, which despite its decline since 2010 remained around 37% of 
its GDP in 2014. India’s forex reserve assets peaked at 21% of GDP 
in 2007 and has fallen since then to around 15% of GDP in 2014.  
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Chart 3.6.a: India: Equity Assets, Liabilities & Forex Reserves (% of 
GDP)	 
 
Source: Calculated from External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database 
 Chart 3.6.b: China: Equity Assets, Liabilities & Forex Reserves (% of 
GDP) 
 
Source: Calculated from External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database 
Chart 3.6.c: Other Emerging Economies: Equity Assets, Liabilities & 
Forex Reserves (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Calculated from External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database 
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In sum, our examination of the international balance sheets shows 
that India and China have experienced a deterioration of their net 
foreign assets position and draw-down of foreign exchange reserves in 
the period since the global financial crisis. The trend of an increasing 
share of equity liabilities in total liabilities witnessed in the two 
decades before the crisis have also got reversed in the post-crisis 
phase, with a higher accumulation of debt liabilities by the emerging 
economies group as a whole. For India, not only is the external debt 
accumulation on the higher side among the emerging economies, but 
its equity liabilities are also dominated by FPI rather than FDI 
liabilities.  
Capital Flows and External Vulnerability 
Financial globalisation has been accompanied by accumulation of 
debt, both domestically and internationally, by all the major 
economies. While the pace of debt accumulation has slowed down to 
an extent in the developed economies following the global financial 
crisis, the emerging economies have witnessed a rise in the pace of 
debt accumulation in the post-crisis period (Buttiglione et. al., 2014). 
BIS (2014) noted that monetary easing in the US and other advanced 
economies after the crisis have driven capital flows into the emerging 
economies, fuelling domestic credit expansion and property price 
bubbles. The private corporate sector of the emerging economies has 
been the largest recipient of this surge in debt inflows, with an 
increasing share of foreign currency debt being raised through bond 
issuance (IMF, 2015). In this section, we examine the quantum and 
composition of debt inflows to India and compare them with other 
emerging economies, using World Bank’s International Debt 
Statistics database. We also assess the impact of debt inflows on 
external vulnerability.  
Charts 3.7 (a, b & c) plots the quantum of net debt inflows, portfolio 
equity and FDI inflows (as % of GNI) to India, China and other 
emerging economies respectively, over time. Debt inflows were the 
most dominant form of capital inflows to the emerging economies in 
the 1980s. With financial opening, foreign equity inflows started 
rising in India and China from the early 1990s, dwarfing net debt 
inflows. Debt inflows to other emerging economies peaked in the mid-
1990s, on the eve of the South East Asian crisis and experienced a 
sharp downslide since then, with equity flows dominating capital 
inflows into the emerging economies till the mid-2000s.  
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Chart 3.7.a: India: Net Debt, FDI and FPI Inflows 
(% of GNI) 
 Source: Calculated from International Debt Statistics Database, World Bank  
 
Chart 3.7.b: China: Net Debt, FDI and FPI Inflows 
(% of GNI) 
 Source: Calculated from International Debt Statistics Database, World Bank 
Chart 3.7.c: Other Emerging Economies: Net Debt, FDI and FPI 
Inflows (% of GNI) 
 
Source: Calculated from International Debt Statistics Database, World Bank 
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The resurgence of debt inflows into emerging economies occured in 
2006, much before the global financial crisis. India also witnessed a 
sudden surge in debt inflows in 2006. The spike in debt inflows to 
China occured much earlier in 2001, but debt inflows have been 
dwarfed by FDI inflows to China, both before and after the global 
financial crisis.  
It can be clearly seen that the surge in debt inflows to the emerging 
economies predates the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent 
monetary easing in the developed economies. However, the impact of 
the post-crisis monetary easing can be seen in the sharp rise of debt 
inflows to the other emerging economies since 2010, crossing the mid-
1990s peak in 2012. While debt inflows have also increased for both 
India and China in the post-crisis period, the extent of the debt surge 
appears to be moderate compared to the other emerging economies.  
Chart 3.8.a: India: Decomposition of Net Debt InFlows 
 (% of GNI) 
  
Source: Calculated from International Debt Statistics Database, World Bank 
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A decomposition of debt inflows to the emerging economies reveal the 
crucial changes that have occured with the progress of financial 
globalisation (Charts 3.8.a, b & c). In the 1980s, public and publicly 
guaranteed (PPG) long-term debt inflows were the dominant form of 
debt inflows to emerging economies, with  the predominance of PPG 
borrowings from commercial banks and multilateral institutions. 
From the 1990s, there was a rise in the inflows of private non-
guaranteed (PNG) long-term debt inflows as well as short-term 
borrowings for the other emerging economies, overshadowing PPG 
borrowings. 
Two cycles of private debt inflows to the emerging economies can be 
discerned in the 1990s, the first one between 1989 to 1993 and the 
second one between 1994 to 1998. The period between 1999 and 2002 
witnessed deleveraging of private debt (both short and long-term), in 
the aftermath of the South East Asian crisis. It is noteworthy that 
both India and China did not witness any significant degree of 
private debt inflows till 2002 and debt inflows for these countries till 
then were primarily PPG debt. Private debt inflows to India and 
China took off only from 2003, along with the commencement of a 
third cycle of debt inflows to the other emerging economies. This 
cycle which lasted till the global financial crisis in 2008 witnessed an 
unprecedented surge of private debt inflows to India and China. 
While debt inflows to India was mainly in the form of long-term 
private commercial bank borrowings and bond issuance, China’s 
private debt inflows was led by short-term debt inflows.13   
The post-crisis surge in debt inflows into emerging economies have 
been in the form of private commercial borrowings coupled with 
PNG bond issuance.14 China has also witnessed a rise in PNG bond 
																																								 																				
13 The surge in short-term debt inflows to China in the 2000s can be partially 
explained by a rise in trade credits (Prasad and Wei, 2007). Rong (2015) reports 
that short-term debt accounted for 76.3% China’s foreign currency debt at end-
2014, nearly half of which was trade credit.  
14 According to IIF (2015) outstanding debt of the emerging economies’ non-
financial corporate sector went up from about 60% in 2008 to over 80% of GDP by 
end-2014, with around 25-30% of this debt denominated in US dollars. There has 
also been a notable shift towards bond financing by the non-financial corporate 
sector in most emerging economies, with the share of bond financing in total non-
financial corporate debt financing increasing by more than 20% in S. Korea and 
Mexico. Other countries that have also witnessed a marked shift towards bond 
financing include Hungary, South Africa, Indonesia and Brazil. The share of bond 
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inflows during this period, while PNG commercial bank borrowings 
have turned negative. In India’s case, however, the post-crisis surge 
in debt inflows has been entirely led by PNG borrowings from 
commercial banks and other financial institutions. Like their 
emerging market economy peers, the Indian private corporates have 
also taken advantage of the easy liquidity conditions prevailing in the 
international debt markets by increasing their external borrowings. 
However, the trend towards international bond issuance witnessed in 
India before the crisis was absent in the post-crisis period.  
Chart 3.8.b: China: Decomposition of Net Debt InFlows 
 (% of GNI) 
 
Source: Calculated from International Debt Statistics Database, World Bank 
 
 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
issuance in foreign currency (mostly dollar denominated) was over 50% in the first 
five months of 2015. 
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Chart 3.8.c: Other Emerging Economies:  
Decomposition of Net Debt InFlows (% of GNI) 
 
Source: Calculated from International Debt Statistics Database, World 
Bank 
The impact of the surge in debt inflows into emerging economies on 
their external balance is also dependent on the overall current 
account balance. For countries with persistent current account 
deficits, a growing dependence on debt inflows to finance such deficits 
increase their external vulnerability. The gross external financing 
requirement (GEFR) in a period — defined as the sum of the current 
account balance (negative), debt servicing on external debt in that 
period and the short-term debt stock at the end of the previous 
period — is a useful indicator of external vulnerability. Chart 3.9 and 
3.10 maps over time, the gross external financing requirement and its 
components to GNI, for India, China and the other emerging 
economies group.  
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Chart 3.9: India: Gross External Financing Requirement 
 (% of GNI) 
 
Source: Calculated from International Debt Statistics Database, World Bank 
   Chart 3.10: India, China & Other Emerging Economies:  
Gross External Financing Requirement (% of GNI) 
 
Source: Calculated from International Debt Statistics Database, World Bank 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the period between 2003 and 2008 was 
also a phase of domestic growth acceleration in India. Unlike China 
or the other emerging economies group, India’s high growth phase in 
the 2000s was accompanied by a deterioration of its external balance. 
Since the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent global recession, all the 
emerging economies have witnessed sharp deterioration in their 
current account balances and GEFR-GNI ratios. India witnessed a 
sharper deterioration of its GEFR-GNI ratio post-2008 because of an 
unprecedented increase in India’s current account deficit from 2010, 
reaching a record 5% of GNI in 2012. With rising short-term debt 
and debt servicing on past borrowings, India’s GEFR-GNI ratio 
reached 11% of GDP in 2012. This had set the stage for capital flight 
from India and sharp currency depreciation during the ‘taper 
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tantrum’ of May 2013, along with Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey and 
South Africa (collectively categorised as the ‘Fragile Five’ in the 
financial press).  
India’s current account balance has seen considerable improvement 
since 2013. Whether such improvement will sustain over time is 
uncertain, since much of the improvement has occured on account of 
a crash in international oil and commodity prices as well as a general 
economic slowdown squeezing import demand. India’s capital goods 
and manufacturing sectors had witnessed a rise in import intensity in 
the 2000s (Chaudhuri 2013; Nagraj 2015). Unless this trend gets 
reversed structurally, an increase in domestic growth will once again 
widen India’s trade and current account deficit. This was seen during 
the phase of high growth between 2003 and 2008, when the 
import/GDP ratio increased faster than the export/GDP ratio (noted 
in Table 1.2 in the first chapter). Moreover, India’s short-term debt 
and external debt-servicing, remained at historically high levels in 
2014, which has prevented a fall in the GEFR-GNI ratio depite the 
improvement of the current account balance.      
The other emerging economies’ group has witnessed a deterioration of 
the current account balance alongside increasing short-term debt, 
leading to a rise in the GEFR-GNI ratio. This points towards 
increasing external vulnerability for some of the economies included 
in the emerging economies group, especially Brazil, Indonesia and 
South Africa. China’s huge foreign exchange reserves act as a buffer 
against BoP difficulties, but its external balance also trends towards 
deterioration. All these emerging economies, which were recipients of 
massive debt-inflows in the post-crisis period are now vulnerable, to 
varying extents, to another monetary shock from the US, which can 
reverse the direction of the debt flows altogether. Such deleveraging 
would affect the private corporate sector most seriously, as was 
witnessed during the South East Asian crisis.  
Foreign Currency Borrowings by Indian Companies 
The surge of external debt inflows to India in the 2000s mainly 
occured in the form of external commercial borrowings (ECBs). The 
stock of ECBs in India witnessed a steep climb from mid-2000s, 
rising from $25 billion in end-March 2004 to almost $150 billion in 
end-March 2014. ECBs account for over one-third of India’s external 
debt, and is its largest component. Outstanding ECBs as a 
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proportion of GDP, rose sharply from around 4% of GDP in 2006 to 
7% in 2009 (Chart 3.11). After a slump in 2010, ECBs have once 
again risen to around 8% of GDP by 2014.  
Chart 3.11: India: ECBs and FCBs  
(% of GDP) 
 
Source: Calculated from RBI, Database on the Indian economy & 
CMIE, Prowess Database 
Chart 3.12 provides a time-series for the implicit interest rate on 
India’s outstanding ECBs, estimated from the data on interest 
payments on ECBs provided by the Finance Ministry’s status reports 
on external debt. It is noteworthy that the increase in ECBs from 
mid-2000s occured alongside a spike in the implicit interest rate on 
ECBs. This is possibly because ECB norms were deregulated from 
2005 onwards, allowing a larger class of borrowers like NBFCs, 
qualified NGOs and cooperative societies access to ECBs.15 Two 
factors have contributed to the growth of ECBs in India in the more 
recent period. First, the ECB norms for the infrastructure sector 
were liberalized, first in 2008 and then in 2013, by progressively 
widening the definition of infrastructure. Second, the decline in the 
interest rate on ECBs since 2008-09, which was an obvious fallout of 
monetary easing in the US and other advanced economies coupled 
with rising lending rates in India since 2010-11, widened the 
differential with the domestic lending rate, incentivising domestic 
companies to borrow from abroad.       
																																								 																				
15 GoI (2015b) provides an overview of how ECB regulations have evolved in India 
in the post-liberalization period.  
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Chart 3.12: India: Interest Rates on ECBs & Domestic 
Lending Rate (%) 
 
Source: Calculated from India's External Debt: A Status Report, MoF, 
various years & Database on Indian Economy, RBI  
The CMIE Prowess database provides data on the ECBs as well as 
total foreign currency borrowings (FCBs) by the Indian non-financial 
companies. Besides ECBs, trade credit is the other category of FCBs. 
The comparison between the aggregate ECB and FCB data provided 
by Prowess database and the total ECB data for India, provided by 
the Ministry of Finance, is provided in Chart 3.11. While total ECBs 
stood at around 8% of GDP in end-March 2014, total FCBs and 
ECBs reported by Prowess were 3% and 2% of GDP, respectively. 
Chart 3.13: Share of ECBs in FCBs (%)  
 
Source: Calculated from CMIE, Prowess Database  
The share of ECBs in overall foreign currency borrowings of the non-
financial companies have increased from around 20% in end-March 
2002 to almost 80% by March-2015. Within ECBs, the share of bonds 
had shown a rapid rise between 2005 and 2007, but has fallen since 
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then. This is consistent with the decomposed international debt 
inflows data (reported in Chart 3.8.a).    
Chart 3.14: FCBs Share in Total Debt: Trade and Non-
Trade Sectors (%) 
 
Source: Calculated from CMIE, Prowess Database  
For all non-financial companies in the Prowess database, the 
proportion of FCBs in total debt shows a rise from 2003 to 2007, 
followed by a gradual decline till 2010, after which it has roughly 
maintained a similar level (Chart 3.14). On average, around 12% of 
total outstanding debt of the non-financial companies in India 
comprised of foreign currency borrowings. It is noteworthy that 
FCBs share in total debt for companies in both the trade and non-
trade sectors grew in tandem from 2003 to 2007. This implied a 
deteriorating risk profile of the overall FCBs, since the foreign 
currency borrowings by the non-trade sector companies have no 
foreign exchange earnings and hence no natural hedge against 
currency risk. Since 2008, however, the shares of FCBs in total debt 
for the non-trade sector companies as well as net-importer companies 
have declined, while the net exporter companies have increased their 
share of FCBs in total debt.    
A similar trend is reflected in the decomposition of the total FCBs by 
the non-financial sector into the non-trade, net importer and net 
exporter categories. The share of the FCBs of net exporter companies 
in total FCBs have risen from around 16% in end-March 2007 to over 
30% in end-March 2014. However, 70% of foreign currency 
borrowings by the non-financial sector in 2015 are by companies who 
are not positive foreign exchange earners. The share of FCBs by non-
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trade sector companies, which have no natural hedge against 
currency depreciations, still remain high at over 60%. 
Chart 3.15: Share of FCBs of Trade and Non-Trade Sectors (%) 
 
Source: Calculated from CMIE, Prowess Database  
 
Policy Issues 
GoI (2015b) has recommended an aggressive liberalization of ECBs 
by removing all existing regulations related to borrowers, lenders, 
end-use, amount, maturity, all-in-cost ceiling etc. It has advocated 
the removal of all restrictions on companies raising ECBs against a 
mandatory commitment to ‘hedge a specified percentage of its 
currency exposure’, either through natural hedge or through currency 
derivatives. In order to facilitate this transition to a fully liberalised 
ECB regime, steps to develop the currency derivatives market have 
been advocated. In sum, the effort is to take apart the hierarchy of 
capital inflows that the RBI has maintained as its policy objective till 
date, in terms of preferring non-debt to debt inflows. The timing of 
such recommendations also coincides with the bad loans crisis faced 
by the domestic banks, which has led to a considerable slowdown in 
domestic credit growth.  
In our view, steps to further liberalize ECB norms would only 
encourage reckless borrowings by the corporate sector, already 
affected by a domestic debt overhang, which is an outcome of past 
excesses. Despite existing regulations and caps, ECBs in India have 
grown at a fast pace over the past decade and a half, owing to 
gradual liberalization on the one hand and the post-crisis debt surge 
towards the emerging economies on the other, facilitated by 
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monetary easing. As our findings in the earlier sections show, India’s 
debt liabilities have shown a rising trend in the post-crisis period, 
increasing its external vulnerability. A further policy shock, 
deregulating access to the international debt markets would send 
perverse signals to the corporate sector. Rather, the policymakers 
need to guard against the fallout of monetary tightening in the US 
and other developed economies, which would inevitably reverse the 
direction of capital flows and create downward pressure on the 
currency.   
The argument regarding a mandatory hedging commitment is also 
unsound, given the structure of India’s current account and trade 
balance and the experience of rising import intensity of the 
manufacturing and capital goods sector during the 2000s. Bulk of the 
foreign currency borrowing by the Indian companies still remains 
concentrated in the non-trade and net-importing sector, which does 
not have any natural hedge. Several episodes of financial crises, the 
latest being the collapse of the housing bubble in the US, have shown 
how the derivatives markets far from efficiently pricing risks, 
themselves become conduits of speculative behaviour. For a country 
like India, which has a persistent trade and current account deficit, a 
deteriorating net financial asset position with moderate levels of 
foreign exchange reserves and a relatively high share of portfolio 
equity liabilities relative to FDI, encouraging further inflows of 
external debt can only be a recipe for financial disaster.     
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Chapter 4
‘Riskless Capitalism’ and External
Vulnerability: A Macrotheoretic Model
This chapter seeks to theoretically analyse the change in growth patterns
in post-reform India based on the empirical chapters presented earlier. While
1991 marks as a break in the Indian economy in terms of opening up, it was
not the 1990s which saw spectacular rates of growth such as those seen in
the 2000s. Our attempt here is to situate in a macrotheoretic model the two
significant booms that this period has witnessed so far: 2003-04 to 2007-08
and 2009-10 to 2010-11.
Methodological Choice
This work belongs in the tradition of demand-driven growth models. A few
words on the methodological choice we make here. While growth under cap-
italism has been the subject matter of enquiry since Adam Smith, modern
growth theory came into existence arguably through Harrod (1939). It was
an attempt to dynamise Keynes’ static analysis of a capitalist economy. Har-
rod (1939) had argued that under capitalism, where expectations about the
market drive accumulation, there will be instability in this process because
the market gives the capitalists perverse signals. Also, while the decision to
invest by capitalists is individual, their decisions have a collective e↵ect ex
post on the extent of market available. His article contained two knife-edges
that the growth process under capitalism throws up – one between the actual
and the warranted rate of growth and the other between the warranted and
the natural rate of growth.
The first knife edge also happens to be the dividing line between two
mutually exclusive camps in modern growth theory: supply-driven (Solow-
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Swan, Cass-Koopmans, New Growth Theory) and demand-driven (Kaleck-
ian, Marxian). While the former does not acknowledge the existence of the
first knife-edge, for the latter it is central. So, all that the supply-driven
growth models do is to solve the second knife-edge (by endogenising the
capital-output and savings ratios), which Harrod himself did not pay much
attention to in his celebrated article (of the 20-odd pages, he devoted just the
last four on it). A defining characteristic of the tradition of supply-driven
growth models is the presence of a production function as opposed to an
investment function, which is a fundamental characteristic of demand-driven
growth models.
That the investment function is critical in a capitalist economy can be
best appreciated by looking at Sen (1970). He brings out the limitations
of the supply-driven growth models by showing that introducing the role
of expectations in the investment behaviour of the capitalists in a model
such as Solow (1956), instead of assuming unrealistically that all savings are
necessarily invested, brings back Harrodian instability despite assuming a
neoclassical production function with perfect substitutability between labour
and capital. He goes on to show that such a flexibility makes the process
of accumulation even more unstable than Harrod had proposed. And Sen’s
critique can be seen as not just limited to Solow but the entire spectrum of
supply-driven growth models.
As opposed to this, the tradition of demand-driven growth models takes
the first knife edge as a point of departure and develops it. Kalecki (1962)
presented a critique of Harrod (1939) from a di↵erent perspective. He argued
that it is true that the warranted rate of growth is unstable (Kalecki called it
‘ephemeral’) in that the economy slides down or explodes in either direction.
But what is more, the economy actually stabilises at a zero rate of growth
in the absence of an exogenous stimuli. In other words, the problems of
accumulation under capitalism are such that the normal state of a↵airs would
be one of no accumulation, i.e. Marx’s simple reproduction. So for there to be
a positive level of accumulation, some form of exogenous stimuli (exogenous
to the process of accumulation) is required. Kalecki believed that innovations
play that role from within the capitalist system whereas the State could also
play the role from outside the pure Laissez Faire system.
Let us spend some time on Kalecki’s argument since the investment func-
tion used here draws from Kalecki (1962). A cornerstone of Kaleckian theory
is the possibility of two steady states, one of which is stable (lower rate
of growth) and the other unstable (higher rate of growth). Patnaik (1997)
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takes the Kaleckian argument even further. He presents an investment func-
tion on the lines suggested by Kalecki (1962) which generates these two rates
of growth. If g is the rate of growth of capital stock (which is the same as
that of output if the technologically given output-capital ratio is the same
throughout), u is capacity utilisation and u0 the desired capacity utilisa-
tion of the capitalists, Patnaik (1997) presents an investment function of the
following form,
gt = gt 1 + b(ut 1   u0)gt 1
It is easy to see that such an investment function produces two rates of
growth, one associated with a zero rate of growth and another with the de-
sired rate of capacity utilisation (Harrod’s warranted rate) with the former
being stable while the latter is unstable. We will be improvising on this in-
vestment function by bringing in some finance related issues raised by Steindl
(1952).
Stylised Facts about the Indian Economy since
2000
Let us first look at certain stylised facts taken from the rich body of empir-
ical evidence presented earlier, which the macrotheoretic model attempts to
explain.
1. Two Booms: Post-2000, there were two phases of high growth in
the Indian economy. The first phase saw a boom between 2003-04 and
2007-08 (5 years) and a bust in 2008-09 whereas the second had a short-
lived two year boom between 2009-10 and 2010-11 followed by a decline
for two years (refer to chart 1.1). Since the partial reversal after that is
suspect for measurement issues, we do not comment on it. We present
two distinct stories below for these two economic booms .
2. Corporate Investment: For both phases, it’s the private corporate
investment that grew the fastest with a sharp jump in the take-o↵ year
(2003-04) when private corporate gross capital formation as a percent-
age of GDP increased from 6.5% to 10.3% (Table 1.3).
3. Flow of Bank Credit: Annual flow of credit (as a percentage of
GDP) from public sector banks (PSBs), as opposed to private banks,
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saw a structural break in 2003-04 and witnessed high levels for both
the booms with a decline in between the two booms during 2008-09
(chart 1.12).
4. Nature of Bank Credit: There was a fundamental di↵erence in the
nature of bank credit between the two booms:
(a) In the first boom, the share of high debt-equity ratio (DER) com-
panies in total debt fell (chart 2.12). Similarly, the share of bank
borrowings by companies with ICR<1 in total bank borrowings
fell in the first boom (chart 2.13).
(b) In the second boom, however, the share of DER>5 companies’
bank borrowings in total bank borrowings (of all non-financial
companies) rose (chart 2.12). Similarly, the share of bank bor-
rowings by companies with ICR<1 in total bank borrowings rose
(chart 2.13). This clearly shows that banks were lending more to
high debt companies in the second phase of the boom.
5. Real Interest Rates: One of the important developments for the first
boom is that the real interest rates fell significantly from 12% in 2000-
01 to 2.5% in 2008-09. This was also reflected in the fall of the prime
lending rate of the SCBs. In contrast, for the second boom, however,
the real rate of interest, short as well as long, increased (Chart 1.8.b
and 1.8.c).
6. Fiscal Policy: The high fiscal deficits of the 1980s had fallen in the
1990s. Following the enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility and Bud-
getary Management (FRBM) legislation, fiscal deficit was reduced dras-
tically in India during the period of the first boom. A “pause” button
was pushed on the FRBM following the global recession and the fiscal
deficit expanded from 2008-09. Chart 1.5.a
7. Current Account: Prior to the first boom, there was a positive cur-
rent account balance for three consecutive years starting from 2001-02
that turned into a deficit again since 2004-05. In contrast, the second
boom happened despite a worsening current account deficit as a result
of the global crisis (chart 1.3). Import intensity of the Indian economy
has been steadily rising in the high growth phase and continues to rise
today.
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8. Gross External Financing Requirements (GEFR): India’s GEFR
to GNI ratio had peaked at around 7% in 1990 and 1991, the time when
India experienced its first BoP crisis. It fell through the 1990s, and
with the current account balance turning positive between 2001-2004,
it reached a low of around 2% in 2002. Since then, there has been
a steady deterioration, both of the curent account balance as well as
accumulation of short-term debt, taking the GEFR-GNI ratio to 8% in
2008 (chart 3.9).
A Growth Model of Neoliberalism
From these stylised facts, we develop a macrotheoretic model, which can be
used as a framework to explain the growth trajectory of the Indian economy
and analyse its faultlines.
Two Constraints
Any economy functions under two constraints. With nominal commitments
carried over from the past, there is an internal constraint that the rate of
profit should at least be equal to the interest accrued on the debt taken in the
past. At a microeconomic level, this is measured by the interest coverage ratio
(ICR), which when less than one means the firm does not have enough profits
to even pay the interest accrued on past debt. The internal constraint of our
model is the inequality that the ICR for the entire non-financial corporate
sector should be greater than 1.
On the other hand, there is an external constraint set by the availability of
foreign exchange. This is particularly relevant for developing economies like
India with persistent current account deficits and negative net foreign assets
positions. This constraint tightens when the import intensity grows with
the growth rate. The external constraint in our model is the BoP condition,
i.e. the GEFR should be equal to net capital inflows and change in foreign
exchange reserves.
Let us look formally at these constraints, which can be seen as boundaries
for the system to function well without either going bankrupt internally or
externally.
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The Internal Constraint
• We make the classical assumption on savings that workers consume
all their wages W while the capitalists save all their post tax profits1.
Taxes are levied only on profit income. GDP measured from the income
side will be the sum of wages and profits and from the expenditure side
a sum of consumption of workers, private corporate investment (I) and
government expenditure (G¯), which is a policy variable and net exports
in domestic currency X¯  M . This will give us a relationship between
the growth rate g and degree of capacity utilisation u, which is the
ratio between actual O and technologically given output O⇤.
W + P = W + I + G¯+ X¯  M
(h+m)O = I + G¯+ X¯; h =
P
O
,M = mO
Dividing by K,
(h+m) · O
O⇤
· O
⇤
K
= g + ⇠ + x¯
u =
g + ⇠ + x¯
(h+m) 
where,
g, ⇠, x¯,   =
I
K
,
G¯
K
,
X¯
K
,
O⇤
K
(1)
• The internal constraint requires corporate retained earning [profits P
- tax T - dividends (1  ✓) as a proportion of post-tax P)] to be more
than the interest payment on accrued debt.
• Corporate sector can borrow a total of D (corporate debt) from do-
mestic and international finance at i and i⇤ with shares µ and 1   µ
1This is done purely for simplying reasons so the results will not change even if we
were to assume both that workers save and capitalists consume a part of their incomes.
That would introduce a few more variables without adding much to the analysis since the
savings rate plays no role here.
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respectively.
✓(P   T )   iµD + i⇤(1  µ)D
g   (h+m)[i
⇤ + (i  i⇤)µ]
(h+ t)✓
    ⇠   x¯
where, t = T/O
  = D/K
(2)
• Upward sloping line with danger zone below it (see figure 1). Corporate
tax breaks, relaxation of ECB norms, appreciation of currency eases
this constraint (shifts down or rotates clockwise).
δ
g
Slope = (h +m)[i*+(i − i*)µ](h + t)θ > 0
x +ξ
Figure 1: The Internal Constraint
The External Constraint
• Being a developing country, it faces a foreign exchange constraint as
well. The requirements arise, among other things, out of the current
account needs as well as the international debt servicing payments ac-
crued in the past.
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• In the capital account, there are 3 kinds of net capital flows, debt
(positively related to the di↵erence between domestic interest rates
i minus some ‘country risk’ ⇢ and international rate of interest i⇤),
foreign portfolio investment, FPI, (moves with the stock market and
growth) and foreign direct investment, FDI, (positively related to the
di↵erence between the rates of growth of the recipient nation and the
nation of origin of finance) flows along with an autonomous component
(↵0) determined by the push factors from the originating countries. So,
f = ↵0 + ↵i(i  ⇢  i⇤) + ↵g(g   g⇤); f = F/K;↵0,↵i,↵g > 0
• External constraint can be represented by the total foreign exchange
requirements from the current account (net imports) plus the interest
payments on accrued foreign debt should be equal to net capital inflows
and change in foreign exchange reserves. Formally, (M   X¯) + i⇤(1  
µ)D = F + R (change in reserves  R). Dividing this by the capital
stock and substituting for f gives us:
i⇤(1  µ)  = ↵0 + ↵i(i  ⇢  i⇤) + ↵g(g   g⇤) + r + x¯ mu 
i⇤(1  µ)  = c¯ 
✓
m
h+m
  ↵g
◆
g
where, c¯ = ↵0 + ↵i(i  ⇢  i⇤)  ↵gg⇤ + r + x¯ m
✓
⇠ + x¯
h+m
◆
 r =  R/K
(3)
• This is a negatively sloped line depicting the trade-o↵ between growth
and external account stability for emerging economies such as India
(see figure 2). To justify this, which requires mh+m > ↵g, we assume
that imports rise faster than the FDI as the growth rate rises. It will
be important to remember that in this external constraint, the danger
zone lies above the line.
Banks’ and Capitalists’ Behaviour Functions
How is investment determined in a capitalist economy? There are two sides
to this story: borrower’s and lender’s. We look at them one at a time.
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δg
c
Slope = i
*(1− µ)(m + h)
m −α g(m + h)
< 0
Figure 2: The External Constraint
Borrower’s Side: Capitalists’ Behaviour
Let us assume that the life of an investment project is n time periods. If the
prospective stream of yields are q1, q2 · · · qn, then the rate of return on this
investment (marginal e ciency of investment, MEI) is determined as follows:
it is that rate which when used to discount the above mentioned stream of
prospective yields, gives rise to a magnitude that equals the value of the
investment project. The shape of the MEI schedule has been under debate
since Kalecki (1937). Keynes (1936) postulated it to be a decreasing function
of the magnitude of current investment on account of decreasing returns to
scale and imperfect competition (see (A) in figure 3).
Kalecki (1937) argued that the above-mentioned two reasons to explain
the negative slope of the MEI in Keynes (1936) are both invalid, the first one
on purely logical grounds whereas the second one contradicts the logical uni-
verse of Keynes’ analysis. Diseconomies of scale may be relevant only when
the capital stock is given but the very act of investment increases the capital
stock, invalidating the premise of diseconomies of scale i.e. fixity of some
‘factor of production’. Further, Kalecki (1937) argued that in competitive
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Figure 3: (A) Keynes’ Vs Kalecki’s MEI and Principle of Increasing Risk;
(B) MEI in an established Oligopoly; (C) MEI in a nascent oligopoly
conditions such as what Keynes (1936) assumed, the MEI schedule should be
horizontal because an individual firm, by virtue of being a price taker, faces
a horizontal demand curve for its products (see (A) in figure 3).
It is clear that the shape of the MEI schedule would be determined by both
the nature of economies of scale as well as the nature of competition in an
industry. With increasing returns to scale under competitive conditions, the
MEI is an increasing function of the amount of investment (Steindl (1945)).
On the other hand, if an industry is functioning strictly under conditions of
established oligopolies, where it is di cult to expand the market share of a
firm, the limit to investment of a firm is set by its expectations about the rate
at which the industry itself expands (a proxy of which could be firm’s past
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capacity utilisation). Under such conditions, the MEI is a vertical schedule
at the level corresponding to expectations about demand (see (B) in figure
3). Each firm within this industry will have its own vertical MEI, the height
of which is determined by the scale of operation of that firm, and the limit is
determined by the share in the market that the firm enjoys (see the di↵erence
in the height as well as the position of the MEIs of firms 1 and 2 in (B) of the
figure). As will be seen below, as well as in the figure, the rate of interest or
the amount of credit available will have no influence on the investment level
unless the firms are credit constrained and not demand constrained2.
But what if there are increasing returns to scale but the industries have
not yet matured3 into established oligopolies i.e. industries in which large
firms are still competing to establish their market shares? This would give us
a kinked investment schedule. There is an upward sloping portion showing
increasing returns to scale (minus the borrower’s risk), which is also a con-
tinuous function depicting the possibilities of expanding one’s share at the
cost of competitors in the same industry. Since there is imperfect competi-
tion, each firm’s maximum sales possible are limited by the industry demand
curve, which sets the limit and, hence, the kink in the MEI schedule (see (C)
in figure 3).
The process described above determines the MEI under di↵ering stages
of maturity of an industry. However, it is not just the MEI that matters
while calculating the returns from an investment, there is another compo-
nent, borrower’s risk, which goes into the decision making. The rationale for
borrower’s risk is given below.
As the magnitude of investment increases, it is likely that a part of that
investment starts getting financed by external sources. As a result there
arises a borrower’s risk on account of two factors: (a) higher is the debt as a
proportion of own capital, higher is the risk of a loss to own capital; (b) since
capital good is illiquid, distress sale in the event of failure of expectations
leads to losses, the magnitude of which rises as investment rises. This implies
that greater the proportion of borrowed funds to own funds (gearing ratio
 ), the higher is the risk of losing one’s own capital.
To arrive at the prospective net profit from an investment project, there-
fore, one needs to subtract the borrower’s risk from the MEI. Higher the
2An investment function for such an industry with the two possibilities existing (but
obviously exclusive to each other) can be imagined as g = min{h( ), f(u)};h0, f 0 > 0.
3The word ‘maturity’ used for these industries has the same meaning as Steindl (1952)
had used in the title of his seminal work.
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gearing ratio, higher the borrower’s risk and lower the investment by firms
on the upward sloping portion of the MEI, which is typically representative
of new (but not necessarily financially small) entrants in industries who are
in the process of getting established.
At any given point in time, there will be mature industries, where demand
(vertical MEI) sets the limit to invest with no role of finance (unless there is a
severe credit squeeze as explained in footnote 2), as well as nascent industries,
where demand (by influencing the MEI) as well as finance constraint (through
borrower’s risk) together set the limit to investment that the firms would like
to undertake.
Based on the discussion above, we can think of an investment function
for the economy as a whole, which has three components with their relative
importance determined by the weightage of di↵erent categories of industries
(mature or nascent) for the period under consideration.
One, there is an autonomous component of investment  0, which, as
Kalecki had argued, is dependent on factors such as innovations. We have
not yet explored the role of the interest rates, which is discussed below, so
su ce here to say that for those firms where finance matters, the cost of
loan is an important factor which will a↵ect investment negatively. With-
out adding an additional argument for the role of the exogenously given real
interest rates, we make the autonomous component  0 move inversely with
it. The interest rate used in this function is a weighted average of the do-
mestic and the international interest rate4. Two, capitalists invest based on
the di↵erence between the expected degree of capacity utilisation and their
desired capacity utilisation (u0). Three, as argued by Steindl (1952), firms
have a desired leverage ratio  0 and investment decreases/increases if the
actual leverage ratio   is greater/lesser than the desired one5.
g˙ =  0(r) +  u(u  u0)g     (     0);  00 < 0;  u,    > 0 (4)
Substituting for u from equation 1, and denoting the Keynesian multiplier
by   = 1/[(h+m) ], this gives us a parabolic function in the ( , g) space of
the following form:
g˙ =   ug
2    u[u0    (⇠ + x¯)] · g       + ( 0 +    0) (5)
4r = (µ · i+ (1  µ) · i⇤)  ⇡, where ⇡ is domestic rate of inflation.
5Steindl’s theory, taking cue from Kalecki (1937), stands in contrast to the mainstream
corporate finance theory that capital structure does not matter in investment decision
making.
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The isocline for this function is a parabola with its axis of symmetry6
parallel to the  -axis with the arrows pointing in the directions as shown
in figure 4. The shape of this curve is determined by the coe cients of
g and  . Economic argument ensures that both the coe cients should be
negative which gives the curve the shape that it has. The coe cient of g is
negative because the capacity utilisation generated exogenously from exports
and government expenditure,  (⇠+ x¯), should always be less than the desired
capacity utilisation u0 otherwise the economy due to exogenous factors alone
will be running without any aggregate demand problems.
δ
g
− B
2 − 4AD
4AC
B
2A
Figure 4: The Growth Isocline
This parabola tells us that for every value of the debt-capital ratio, there
are two growth rates possible, much like Kalecki’s argument (Kalecki (1962)).
At lower rates of growth, a decline in the gearing ratio leads to an increase in
investment as there is a decline in the borrower’s risk, as captured by     .
But after a certain point higher growth rate itself starts dominating this risk
averse tendency of the capitalists so that even if the gearing ratio is rising,
the rate of growth rises. Such an investment function generates multiple
6The vertex of the parabola is given by g = B2A ,   =  B
2 4AD
4AC , where A =   u,
B =  u[u0    (⇠ + x¯)], C =   , D =  0 +    0.
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equilibria, as we will see below, so that the tendency towards stagnation
exists along side the ‘growth begets growth’ tendency with a tipping point
happening at a particular rate of growth and a debt-capital ratio (vertex of
the parabola).
Let us consider a few stylised facts mentioned above to see how this curve
responds to them. The discussion presented here can be considered in terms
of the two symmetrical arms of the parabola, the upper arm corresponding
to the ‘growth begets growth’ tendency whereas the lower one corresponding
to the stagnationist tendency.
1. A fall in the real rate of interest (r #!  0 ") due to a fall in domestic
interest rates, our stylised fact 6, will shift the vertex of the curve
laterally to the right (see footnore 2 and 3). Similarly a fall in the
international rate of interest will also have the same e↵ect as above.
For the lower arm, this means that the rate of growth would rise for
a given debt-capital ratio since a fall in the interest rate pushes up
investment demand.
2. There were two di↵erent triggers to high growth, though not responsible
for its sustenance, in the two phases respectively.
(a) In the first boom, it was a sudden spurt in export demand (stylised
fact 2) so that export as a proportion of capital stock increased.
(b) For the second, it was a policy decision in the post-global economic
crisis conditions, when active injection of demand through fiscal
policy was made to tide over its e↵ects (stylised fact 7).
Since these are both triggers and not structural changes, we present
them as a sudden northward jump o↵ the growth isocline rather than
a shift in the curve itself (which would have been justified had these
changes been permanent in nature). This means that the rate of growth
would rise for a given debt-capital ratio since these factors push up the
demand in the short run.
3. A rise in the import intensity (m "!   #), our stylised fact 8, shifts the
vertex to the northwest. For the lower arm, this means that the rate
of growth would fall for a given debt-capital ratio since an increase in
import intensity means a leakage of demand from the domestic economy
i.e. the Keynesian multiplier falls.
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Lender’s Side: Banks’ Behaviour
Bank lending plays a central role in our model. Their role enters the picture
through the cost of loans which is given by the sum of interest rates and
lender’s risk as in Kalecki (1937).
Kalecki (1937) argued that given the asymmetry of information about
profitability between lenders and the borrowers, the lenders ask for a higher
risk premium as the leverage (or debt-equity ratio) rises. So, that part of
investment, which is financed by debt, can be limited by bank finance (not
savings) because the banks might set a limit to lending both through the
interest rate changes as well as credit rationing. They can target a   through
these two instruments. Banks in India seem to have used these two instru-
ments to control the magnitude of bank debt. They can both persuade and
dissuade borrowing through these instruments. In the case of nascent indus-
tries, banks can help increase investment by decreasing interest rates and/or
relaxing their risk curve (the latter is shown in (C) in figure 3). Our model
does not specify the targeting rule explicitly.
To be sure, while bank debt can set a limit to investment during exuber-
ance (i.e. when MEI-borrower’s risk>interest rate+lender’s risk) through an
increase in e↵ective cost of loans, in conditions of extreme pessimism (MEI-
borrower’s risk<lender’s risk), banks cannot force the corporate sector to
borrow necessarily. This asymmetry, for reasons of simplicity, has been left
out in the model.
Banks have a desired debt capital ratio  d, which is positively related to
the rate of growth depicting their willingness to lend more when the growth
rate increases ( g measures the sensitivity of this relationship). Together
with an autonomous component,  0, which captures the general state of
confidence of the bankers about the investment climate as well as the lending
rules institutionally in place, this desired rate can be written as follows:
 d =  0 +  gg
Banks being risk averse try to increase/decrease the actual   depending
on whether it is lesser/greater than the desired rate.
 ˙ = ⇥( d    ) ⇥ > 0
= ⇥( 0 +  gg    )
(6)
The isocline for this function is a positively sloped straight line showing
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the willingness of the banks to lend more as the rate of growth rises with the
phase arrows showing in the direction as depicted in fig. 5.
g
δλ0
Figure 5: The Debt Isocline
Our central argument about the two growth phases in the 2000s is that
while the fiscal arm of the State withdraws in the neoliberal regime, there is
no withdrawal of the State but it is only the nature of the intervention that
changes. Far from laissez faire, the State plays its economic cards through
the public sector banks. So, while it is true that the State does not play
a direct role in demand management in this regime, except in conditions of
recessions, it acts as a guarantor for the capitalists when it comes to seeking
loans from banks, especially the public owned ones.
With the tacit backing of the State, the public sector banks are made
to relax their risk function with the understanding that the State will bail
them out should the need arise. In the process, capitalists are the biggest
gainers as they do risky business with other people’s money. If they win,
they get to keep the spoils and if they lose, the State ends up cleaning their
act. Increasing corporate delinquencies and clamour for debt write-o↵s can
be seen as a demand for the State to clean up. Analytically, this could be
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captured through a tendency of the desired rate to rise for a given rate of
growth i.e. a rise in  g. In other words, banks become higher risk takers.
This desired rate can be further increased through relaxation of corporate
lending norms in order to promote private investments and PPPs. This latter
possibility can be captured by a rise in  0.
Let us look at a few stylised facts in the context of this relationship.
1. Stylised fact 4 tells us that the increase in the growth rate was accom-
panied by a rise in the debt-capital ratio. This can be understood as a
movement up the debt-iscoline.
2. Institutional reforms, such as the demise of the Development Financial
Institutions (DFIs) in India and the encouragement provided to the
commercial banks to expand corporate lending entails an exogenous
push to bank lending, represented by a rightward shift in the intercept.
3. Stylised facts 5(a) and 5(b) represents a clockwise shift of the curve,
which represents a relaxation in the risk function of the banks ( g #).
While 5(a) represents absence of ponzi finance, 5(b) shows that a credit
bubble was sought to be created in the second boom through ponzi
finance since here, unlike the first boom, the share of debt of companies
who could not even cover their interest payments was increasing.
Dynamics of the Macro system
Having laid down the building blocks of the growth model, we can bring them
together to see the growth experience of the Indian economy in the 2000s.
An analytical model also helps us see di↵erent possibilities about the future
trajectory of the economy.
Let us bring the two di↵erential equations and the two isoclines together.
g˙ =  0 +  u(u  u0)g     (     0)
 ˙ = ⇥( 0 +  gg    )
(7)
This system generates two rates of growth, the lower one shown by E1
is a stable node and the higher one shown by E2 (with higher  ) is a saddle
point (see fig. 6).
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Figure 6: Macrodynamics of the two rates of growth in the model
Opening Up of the Indian Economy and the Constraints
External Constraint: The external constraint got relaxed with capital
account liberalisation which eased the flow of finance (↵0 "). India also
started attracting higher debt inflows due to the interest rate di↵erential
(i   ⇢   i⇤). With the rate of growth of exports going up prior to the first
boom (x¯ "), foreign exchange problem gets further relaxed. Intercept of the
external constraint moved up because of all these factors. Also international
finance capital’s response to growth increased in this phase ↵g ", which was
accompanied by a fall in the international rates of interest. These rotate
the constraint anti-clockwise (see figure 7). All in all the external constraint
moves up to make higher growth possible at a given debt-capital ratio.
Internal Constraint: State providing corporate tax concessions in-
creases retained earnings so, the corporate sector can incur a higher debt-
capital ratio at a given rate of growth, which leads to a clockwise rotation of
the internal constraint (slope falls). Any cheapening of credit (through a fall
in the nominal interest rate, domestic and international alike) also relaxes
this constraint (see figure 7).
With financial liberalisation and opening up, both the constraints open
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δg
Figure 7: Relaxation of the 2 Constraints
up, thereby creating possibilities of a wider range of growth rates than hith-
erto possible. But then they are just necessary and not su cient conditions
for higher growth. For the actual movement in the growth rates, we need to
take a closer look at the two isoclines mentioned above. Let us look at the
two booms separately.
First Boom (5 years): 2003-04 to 2007-08
Starting from a comparatively lower equilibrium (N) of the 1990s (see figure
8), a lowering of the risk function of the public sector banks both due to
institutional changes as well as tacit backing of the State, the debt isocline
shifts to the right (for reasons discussed above).
This was also accompanied by lower real interest rates (stylised fact 6)
which encouraged the corporations to take more credit (stylised fact 3) both
domestically as well as internationally (external commercial borrowings ac-
counted for higher proportion of total capital inflows). Despite RBI’s stated
policy stance of “encouraging non-debt creating and long-term capital in-
flows and discouraging debt flows”, debt and short term capital flows have
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dominated the flow of capital in and out of India over the 2000s. In terms
of our diagram, these factors shift the growth isocline to the right (due to a
fall in r). So there was dual-route injection of corporate credit in the econ-
omy: risk function relaxation as well as cost reduction (domestically as well
as internationally).
There are again two steady state growth rates possible. Will the economy
move to the higher one B, a saddle point, rather than the lower one A, a
stable node (see these relative to point N in figure 8)?
N	 A	
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Figure 8: Boom of 2003-04 to 2007-08
Our argument about the trigger of high exports is that if it pushed the
economy beyond a critical value (gc in figure 8) after which the upper arm
of the growth isocline comes into play, then the economy might take path
1 and temporarily settle at B (duration of the first boom). It is temporary
because it is a saddle point so that any movement away from the stable arm
will be destabilising. So, the economy witnesses a high growth rate but it
comes along with a high debt-capital ratio.
One could ask why is it necessary that the initial trigger would be such
as to push the economy on the stable arm (path 1) of the saddle point?
It may not, in fact, this is just one of the many possibilities (see the two
possible paths – 1, 2 – above the upper arm) once the rate of growth crosses
the upper arm of the growth isocline as a result of the export-trigger. But
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in so far as the trigger is great enough to push the economy beyond that
critical value, there will be a spurt in growth and debt-capital ratio with the
economy eventually hitting the external constraint (path 2).
The initial trigger of high exports prior to the first boom and greater
capital inflows also took gross external financing requirement (GEFR) - gross
national income (GNI) ratio to a new low. However, since 2003 there has
been a steady deterioration, both of the current account balance as well as
in terms of short-term debt accumulation, taking the GEFR-GNI ratio to
8% in 2008. This shows that while exports definitely acted as a trigger, they
could not have been responsible for sustenance of the boom. It is here that
credit-financed corporate investment, which saw a structural break in 2003
(stylised fact 3, 4, 5(a)), becomes critical in explaining the sustenance of the
boom beyond the initial spurt in export demand. In the absence of this, the
economy with an initial surplus in the current account with a fall later would
have brought the economy to A.
Second Boom (2 years): 2009-10 to 2010-11
With the global economic crisis setting in 2008-09, there was a drastic fall in
the rate of growth of exports, which dropped the economy from B initially.
Therefore, growth rate declined through the year 2008-09. It is at this point
that there was an attempt to jack up growth through a direct injection of
demand through corporate tax concessions as well as expansionary fiscal
expenditure (stylised fact 7) which compensated for a fall in the exports (see
fig. 9). Quite like what exports did in the first boom, fiscal policy did it in
the second. But then this might just as a trigger not necessarily as a factor
which sustained the boom.
Sustenance of the boom for two years was made possible since PSBs were
made to further relax their risk curves (a fall in the debt isocline) to spur
in credit-financed corporate investment similar to the first boom. This led
to a higher growth as well as debt-capital ratio, depicted by C in fig. 9
(stylised fact 5(b)). The centrality of credit in this boom comes out clearly
in the second year (2010-11) of the boom, which was the highest ever since
the post-reform period (chart 1.1).
A rising trade deficit as a result both of higher growth and declining
export market made the external financing requirements binding with a fall
in the external constraint. This constraint could fall in such a way so as to
make C unsustainable, something which brought the Indian economy during
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this period to the brink of a balance of payments crisis witnessed in continual
fall in the value of the Rupee. The government could arrest this movement
only by discouraging imports of gold and other items by increasing customs
duties to ward o↵ such a crisis. In today’s context, the external constraint
does not seem to be binding since the growth rate started declining by then
as we see below.
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Figure 9: Boom of 2009-10 to 2010-11
This boom was, however, short-lived (just 2 years) both because of the
unstable nature (saddle point) of this growth rate as well as a rise in the do-
mestic real rate of interest from 2010-11 (stylised fact 6) due to RBI’s e↵orts
towards inflation targeting. This step of the RBI reversed the movement
of the growth isocline back towards its initial position in the 1990s (see fig.
9). It did not fall all the way back to the 1990s’ growth isocline because
international borrowing costs were still quite low due to monetary easing in
the US in the aftermath of the global economic crisis. So, r in our growth
isocline increased only partially (see footnote 2 and 3). In other words, while
cost of domestic credit increased, its international counterpart remained very
low, which led to a change in the composition of corporate credit in favour
of external commercial borrowings.
With such a leftward shift in the growth isocline as a result of the increase
in domestic interest rates, it can be seen in figure 9, that the growth rate of
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the second boom C now falls on the unstable path of the saddle point and the
economy starts falling precipitously. A fall in the growth rate precipates a
further fall, thereby, threatening to hit the lower constraint, which has risen
as a result of rising nominal interest rates.
When the economy hits the lower constraint, it leads to large scale non-
performing assets (NPAs) in the balance sheets of public sector banks such as
being witnessed today. State acts as an implicit guarantor for the capitalists
when it comes to seeking loans from banks, especially the public owned ones.
As we saw above, banks’ constraints are relaxed since their risk is shared
by the State. It is a win-win situation for the capitalists. In the process,
they are the biggest gainers as they do risky business with other people’s
money. If they win, they get to keep the spoils. If they lose, the State ends
up cleaning their act.
Make in India: Where Are We Headed?
An attempt towards repeating the 2001-02 to 2003-04 spurt in exports to
usher in booms similar to 2000s is what the Make in India campaign is
about. There are a few impediments to that.
One, there is a fallacy of composition in the strategy of export-oriented
growth as a panacea for growth of all the economies. All countries cannot be
export-oriented at the same time. Obviously some of them would have to be
import-oriented to be able to accommodate others export-oriented growth.
And if there are limited markets abroad to compete for - like the present
situation where the global recession has led to a shrinkage in world trade
- more di cult will it be for an export-oriented strategy to succeed for an
economy like India’s, which does not enjoy the first mover’s advantage in
most sectors.
Two, this strategy has to be in contradiction with a domestic demand
driven approach. This is so because it requires a continuous decline in the
cost of production, a significant proportion of which is the wage cost, to
outcompete the rivals. Two ways in which one can keep the relative wage
costs down is by depressing the wages and/or increasing the productivity of
labour relative to the competitors. Both these involve a fall in the share
of wages in the economy (as has been the case with the Chinese or other
such experiments). This squeezes the domestic demand in the economy in
the long run either through a fall in incomes (wage fall) or unemployment
(through labour displacing technological expansion). This contradiction is
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clearly visible with the Chinese today, who are finding it di cult to move
from an export-oriented strategy towards a domestic demand driven strategy.
And in this race to the bottom, if one does not win, one ends up losing on
both ends, neither will there be an external market created nor a domestic
market remaining.
Three, the other part of the cost, raw materials, requires the corporates to
be given a free-hand in terms of exploiting the natural resources. Corporate
scams across the Third World today are mere reflection of how desperate
they are to grab the resources without paying for the same, all in the name
of outcompeting the ‘external’ rivals in this race. The extent of environmental
degradation domestically coupled with exploitation of the resource-rich-but-
politically-weak countries abroad should also be a matter of concern.
Last but not the least, this growth, if delivered, would still be in control
of the importing nations. If for some reason, they hit a roadblock in terms of
providing a market, as is happening today, it will have a cascading e↵ect on
the export-oriented economies who would have lost the fall back options in
the very process. Chinese talk of a ‘new normal’ and di culties in achieving
it is merely a recognition of this problem.
Let us further look at two specific analytical points in the immediate
future which are relevant for the model discussed above.
A US taper
In an eventuality of a rise in the international rate of interest and flight
of capital, both the constraints close in, thereby, making the higher rate of
growth, if attempted again, inaccessible just as it was in the 1990s. The two
constraints are given as below. Current government’s Make in India attempt
to make the economy attractive for international finance should be seen as
an attempt to push the external constraint outwards.
i⇤(1  µ)  = A 
✓
m
h+m
  ↵g
◆
g
g = (h+m)[i
⇤ + (i  i⇤)µ]
(h+ t)✓
    ⇠   x¯
Rising import intensity
It has been witnessed that the import intensity of this growth process has
been rising. If this trend coninues, the external constraint becomes a concave
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function since at higher rates of growth the external financing rises faster
since imports are rising faster at higher rates of growth. This might again
make the higher growth rate infeasible. If, however, the make in India e↵ort
succeeds in getting higher financial inflows in the form of FDI or even FPI,
then a rising import intensity will be partially countered.
Conclusion
We have attempted in this chapter to provide a theoretical structure to the
Indian growth story in the 2000s as presented through compelling evidence
in the previous chapters. We divide this decade in two booms: 2003-04 to
2007-08 and 2009-10 to 2010-11. The first boom was triggered by export
surge prior to the boom accompanied by public sector bank lending, debt
inflows and low real interest rates. The second boom, however, was triggered
by an active fiscal policy accompanied by more reckless lending (since it was
increasing despite an increase in domestic interest rates) by the public sector
banks as well as debt inflows. These high growth rates, though possible, are
saddle points so an initial fall leads to a precipitous fall leading the economy
to stagnationist growth path or hit the internal constraint with calamitous
e↵ects on the balance sheets of the public sector banks.
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